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In recent years, states from Delaware to Dubai have been establishing something in 
between courts and arbitration, what this Article calls “arbitral courts.” Arbitral courts 
mimic arbitration’s traditional features. They hire internationally well-regarded judges who 
may also work as arbitrators. They claim the neutrality, expertise, and sometimes the 
privacy and confidentiality of  international arbitration. Unlike arbitration, however, they 
bind third parties, develop law, and wield the power of  the state. 
This Article identifies, theorizes, and explores the significance of  these new arbitral 
courts. Arbitral courts unsettle traditional distinctions between public and private 
adjudication. Their appearance has significant consequences not only for understanding the 
state of  the evolving international judicial system, of  which U.S. courts have historically 
been an important part, but also for the future of  legitimacy and transparency in dispute 
resolution around the world.  
There is much to applaud about the innovation of  arbitral courts. But questions 
remain about whether there is and should be a dividing line between public and private 
adjudication. This Article uses arbitral courts to investigate that line by distinguishing 
between courts’ and arbitral tribunals’ claims to legitimacy and their needs for 
transparency and publicity. It argues that arbitral courts have the potential to develop 
influential transnational law—if  they can maintain the traditional openness of  courts 
despite parties’ preferences for confidentiality. To do so, they should publicly declare their 
commitment to being a public institution and take other steps to ensure that they maintain 
transparency over time, even when other forces—like the parties’ preferences—pressure 
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“Once upon a time, I . . . dreamt I was a butterfly . . . Soon I awaked, and 
there I was, veritably myself  again. Now I do not know whether I was then a 
man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, dreaming I 
am a man.”  
– Zhuangzi (Chinese philosopher, c. 369 BC – c. 286 BC)1
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, Delaware enacted a statute allowing Chancery Court judges to 
act as arbitrators.2 For controversies involving at least one Delaware business 
entity, no consumers, and amounts in dispute over $1 million, the parties 
could agree to have a Chancery Court judge arbitrate their dispute. The 
proceedings would be confidential and held in the Delaware courthouse for 
a filing fee of  $12,000, plus $6,000 for each additional hearing day. Regular 
Chancery Court procedure and evidence rules would apply, but the parties 
could agree to modify them.3 The judges could grant any remedy they 
“deem[ed] just and equitable and within the scope of  any applicable 
agreement of  the parties.”4 The losing party could appeal the “order of  the 
Court of  Chancery” to the Delaware Supreme Court, but subject to Federal 
Arbitration Act standards of  review. The arbitration petitions and decisions 
would be confidential, but once appealed they could become part of  the 
public record.5 Delaware designed the statute, Chief  Justice Myron Steele 
explained, “to keep the United States, and in particular, Delaware, 
competitive in international business dispute resolution.”6 
In 2013, a Third Circuit panel declared that these “government-
sponsored arbitrations” violated the First Amendment’s right of  public 
access to trials because of  their confidential nature.7 The Third Circuit 
judges debated whether the Delaware statute created a court that had some 
arbitration-like features (like confidentiality, optional procedural rules, 
limited appellate review), which would require public access, or an arbitral 
tribunal that had some court-like features (Delaware Chancery judges, 
Delaware courthouse), which would not. In fractured decisions, two of  the 
three judges thought Delaware had unconstitutionally created confidential 
                                               
1. WILLIAM EDWARD SOOTHILL, THE THREE RELIGIONS OF CHINA: LECTURES DELIVERED 
AT OXFORD 75 (1913) (quoting 1 THE TEXTS OF TAOISM 197 (James Legge trans., 1891)). 
2. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (2009); Del. Ch. Ct. R. 96-98. 
3. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 2013). 
4. Id. at 513.  
5. See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1821 (2014). 
6. Myron T. Steele et al., Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 
375, 380 (2013). 
7. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 733 F.3d at 512, 521. Judge Roth of Delaware dissented. 
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courts.8 Delaware’s courts had to be open to the public.9 The Third Circuit 
thus thwarted Delaware’s attempt to create a court-arbitration hybrid—what 
this Article calls an “arbitral court.”10  
The Third Circuit’s decision reflects both conventional civil procedure 
theory and arbitration theory about the dividing line between courts and 
arbitration. According to these theories, courts are public, “procedurally 
rigorous,” and state-sponsored; arbitration is private, “faster and cheaper but 
with fewer procedural safeguards.”11 Courts’ authority derives from the 
state; their power extends as far as the state’s.  
Arbitration, by contrast, is understood as both a private dispute 
resolution mechanism replacing courts and a creature of  contract.12 The 
parties’ agreement both defines and limits arbitral tribunals’ authority. While 
scholars have recognized a convergence of  procedures in different fora13 
and bemoaned both the privatization of  court procedure14 and the 
judicialization of  arbitration,15 the understanding has been that courts and 
arbitration stay in their lanes.16  
Over the past fifteen years, however, a new wave of  courts has exploded 
those traditional distinctions. In addition to the Delaware experiment, 
international commercial courts that borrow traits from arbitration have 
been established in Dubai (2004), Singapore (2015), the Netherlands 
                                               
8. Id. at 521. 
9. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and 
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2937 (2015) (discussing the importance of “public faith in the 
Delaware judicial system”). 
10. This term has occasionally been used to describe international arbitration tribunals, like the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, see, for example, Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial 
System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 482 (2003), or private community tribunals, see, for example, Joseph 
Kary, Judgments of Peace Montreal’s Jewish Arbitration Courts, 1914-1976, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 436, 436 
(2016). Here, it describes domestic courts that mirror arbitration. 
11. Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE 
L.J. 2994, 2996 (2015). 
12. See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and 
Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 458-69 (2010). 
13. See, e.g., Aaron D. Simowitz, Convergence and the Circulation of Money Judgments, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1031 (2019); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 442 
(2010). 
14. See, e.g., Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 5; Hazel Genn, What Is Civil Justice For? Reform, 
ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397 (2012); Dustin B. Benham, Foundational and 
Contemporary Court Confidentiality, in DANGEROUS SECRETS: CONFRONTING CONFIDENTIALITY IN 
OUR PUBLIC COURTS (2020). 
15. See, e.g., Rémy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of 
International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223, 227 (2014). 
16. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1119 (2019) 
(detailing the Supreme Court’s treatment of litigation and arbitration as opposites); cf. Hiro N. Aragaki, 
The Metaphysics of Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 541 (2018) (debunking conventional wisdom about the sharp 
divide between courts and arbitration in order to contemplate the existential question of what 
arbitration is). 
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(2019).17 In the same period, tax havens such as Bermuda, the British Virgin 
Islands, and the Cayman Islands, the place of  incorporation for many 
foreign firms, have established new business courts that “look a lot like 
commercial arbitration.”18 This Article considers Delaware’s government-
sponsored arbitration experiment, some international commercial courts,19 
and these offshore business courts to be “arbitral courts.”  
Arbitral courts are domestic courts. Individual states20 create and fund 
them (at least as a formal matter; if  funded by users’ fees, those are paid to 
the state and can be redistributed as the state sees fit). Arbitral courts render 
binding decisions that have the force of  legal judgments, enforceable by the 
power of  that creating state. They can issue subpoenas and injunctions. 
They can join or bind non-consenting third parties. They can develop law; 
under common law traditions, they can declare law and establish precedent. 
The subject matter of  the disputes, the parties to the disputes, and even the 
judges may be foreign to the state, but the institution of  the arbitral court is 
domestic to the creating state. 
Courts, especially commercial courts, have been trying to respond to 
parties’ preferences for speed, flexibility, and expertise for decades.21 In a 
number of  ways, court procedure has become increasingly privatized—for 
example, through managerial judging, court-annexed arbitration, and 
increased party control over procedures.22  
Arbitral courts take these efforts several steps further—blatantly 
replicating features of  international commercial arbitration.23 They allow 
                                               
17. Many, but not all, of the courts known as “international commercial courts” would fit this 
Article’s definition of arbitral courts. See infra Part II.  
18. Will Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. L. REV. 1403, 1441 (2020).  
19. There is a small but growing literature on international commercial courts—domestic courts 
with subject matter limited to international commercial disputes. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The 
Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT’L L. 227, 230 n.13 (2020) (collecting sources). Much of this 
literature acknowledges that these courts have borrowed some features from international commercial 
arbitration and considers whether they can effectively compete with arbitration to be disputants’ 
chosen forum. See, e.g., Janet Walker, Specialized International Courts: Keeping Arbitration on Top of Its Game, 
85 INT’L J. ARB., MEDIATION & DISP. MGMT. 2 (2019); Dalma Demeter & Kayleigh M. Smith, The 
Implications of International Commercial Courts on Arbitration, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 441, 441 (2016); Stephan 
Wilske, International Commercial Courts and Arbitration—Alternatives, Substitutes or Trojan Horse?, 11 
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 153 (2018); Thomas Schultz & Clément Bachmann, A Wig for Arbitrators: What 
Does it Add? (King’s Coll. London L. Sch., Paper No. 2019-33, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y3wqkxtm. 
20. “State” here refers to a sovereign, whether a U.S. state, foreign country, or foreign locality. 
See State, in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
21. See, e.g., John Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 
1921 (2012); The Right Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales, Grand Court of the Cayman Islands Guest Lecture: Giving Business What It Wants – A Well 
Run Court for Commercial and Business Disputes (Mar. 2, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y4eqk82q. 
22. See infra Part II.B.  
23. At its most basic, “[a]rbitration is a process by which parties consensually submit a dispute to 
a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties [in accordance with the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate], to render a binding decision resolving [that] dispute in accordance with neutral, 
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parties to choose which forum hears the dispute (often regardless of  the 
states’ connections to it); which procedures guide the dispute; whether the 
proceedings or the decision will be open to the public or kept confidential; 
and what law governs the dispute, potentially even if  parties select non-
state-created law, like general equitable principles, or rules articulated by 
organizations like the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL). Although arbitral courts operate in English—even in 
non-English-speaking countries—the courts employ foreign judges and 
allow foreign lawyers to appear before them. They also permit parties to opt 
out of  appeals.  
This Article identifies, theorizes, and explores the significance of  
arbitral courts.24 Descriptively, the Article recognizes arbitral courts as the 
vanguard of  international commercial dispute resolution.25 They are 
domestic institutions designed to hear cases involving actors or 
controversies that cross borders.26 As such, they are an important addition 
                                               
judicial procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard.” GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 336 (2d ed. 2015); see also id. at 131-32 (collecting definitions 
of arbitration). 
24. Scholars have recognized that several international commercial courts appear to be “hybrid” 
courts. But the literature neither offers a robust description of what that means, nor does it analyze 
international commercial courts together with other examples of arbitral courts, like the Delaware and 
Cayman Islands examples. See, e.g., Firew Tiba, The Emergence of Hybrid International Commercial Courts and 
the Future of Cross Border Commercial Dispute Resolution in Asia, 14 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 31, 32, 47 
(2016) (defining the SICC as a hybrid international court because “some of its judges are from overseas 
jurisdictions”); Yuko Nishitani, Party Autonomy in Contemporary Private International Law, 59 JAPANESE 
Y.B. INT’L L. 300, 306 (2016) (“[S]ome jurisdictions have started providing, in international commercial 
cases, new dispute resolution mechanisms that transcend the conventional threshold between litigation 
and arbitration.”); Aragaki, supra note 16, at 564-65 (asking whether international commercial courts 
like the one in Singapore is an example of “arbitration” or a “court,” and whether the question matters). 
25. This Article focuses on international commercial disputes for several reasons. First, the 
arbitral courts studied here focus on those disputes. Second, that focus facilitates more coherent 
discussion about a specific kind of arbitration, avoiding confusion stemming from the multiplicity of 
different kinds of arbitration. See, e.g., Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1129 
(choosing the same focus for similar reasons). Third, international commercial disputes involve high 
stakes—not just in terms of the dollar amounts in controversy, but in terms of their impact on global 
governance, as the natural result of an expanding global economy. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET & 
FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, 
GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY (2017). Future research should explore the possibility and implications 
of arbitral courts in other areas. 
26. By contrast, international institutions are created and supported by multiple states. Examples 
of international courts include the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, and the International Criminal Court. The distinction between courts and arbitration on the 
international plane—such as the proper classification of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the 
Hague—raises different sets of issues beyond the scope of this Article. See generally INTERNATIONAL 
COURT AUTHORITY (Karen Alter et al. eds., 2018); LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
(Nienke Grossman et al. eds., 2014); Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts: Uneven Judicialization in 
Global Order, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (J. Crawford & M. Koskenniemi 
eds., 2011). 
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to the “international judicial system.”27 Theoretically, the Article situates the 
emergence of  arbitral courts in the context of  broader debates over 
public/private distinctions,28 the judicialization of  arbitration, and the 
privatization of  procedure.29  
Arbitral courts shift and blur traditional boundaries between public and 
private adjudication. They reveal the power of  procedural innovation and 
forum shopping as forces of  institutional change, which I have explored in 
previous work.30 But as institutions at the cross-roads of  public and private 
adjudication, arbitral courts reveal not only the possibilities but also the 
limits of  experimentation and party autonomy over procedure, especially if  
the parties control whether proceedings, opinions, and judgments are kept 
confidential. To establish and maintain their legitimacy, their future impact 
and ability to attract cases, and their capacity to develop law, arbitral courts 
should take steps early on to dedicate themselves to being public institutions. 
Likely incentive structures may lead arbitral courts to cater to parties’ 
requests for confidentiality. This Article therefore advocates that arbitral 
courts should take extra steps to bind themselves now to transparency 
protocols that would reject or significantly limit grants of  such requests. 
Part II of  this Article describes the traditional divide between courts 
and arbitral tribunals and then maps trends and debates about the 
judicialization of  arbitration and the privatization of  procedure in courts.  
Part III defines an arbitral court as a court that puts its publicness in the 
hands of  the parties—offering them options like those available in 
arbitration, such as confidentiality and optional procedures, but also 
allowing them access to the full breadth of  the court’s state power. This Part 
identifies common characteristics of  arbitral courts and profiles five 
prototypical examples of  arbitral courts, from Delaware, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Dubai, and the Cayman Islands. These are not the only examples 
                                               
27. Martinez, supra note 10; see also, e.g., Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 
61 DUKE L.J. 775, 776 (2012); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011). 
28. See generally ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2009); Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1425 
(1982); cf. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 171 (“[W]e do not make a sharp theoretical 
distinction between public and private law and process.”). 
29. There has been much emphasis on the procedural differences between courts and arbitration, 
reflecting a concern about “efficiency,” speed and costs, but translating into distinctions about 
procedural flexibility, class treatment, availability of appellate review, and the like. See Bookman, 
Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16 (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the differences 
between litigation and arbitration). In previous work, I have demonstrated that these are not proper 
distinguishing factors between public and private adjudication. Id. Increasingly, there are courts with 
arbitration-like features and arbitration with litigation-like features, especially in international 
commercial disputes. Arbitral courts take this overlap to a new level. 
30. See Pamela K. Bookman & David Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (2017); 
Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2017). 
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of  arbitral courts in the world, but they are the most arbitration-like courts 
in each region where arbitral courts are appearing.31  
Part IV, the analytical heart of  the paper, evaluates three ways in which 
arbitral courts test the boundaries between public and private adjudication. 
It first critiques arbitral courts’ manipulation of  legitimacy and jurisdiction. 
Arbitral courts claim legitimacy that derives from the same source as 
arbitration’s legitimacy—the parties’ freedom of  contract and voluntary 
submission to the forum. But they also claim jurisdiction and power that 
derives from the state—asserting traditional court powers over non-
consenting parties, over issues that parties did not voluntarily submit to the 
court’s jurisdiction, and over general law development. This attempt at 
duality may seem at first blush to lay claim to a double layer of  legitimacy. 
This Part argues, however, that it could instead lead to legitimacy and 
enforcement problems, for example if  arbitral courts exert jurisdiction over 
non-consenting parties over whom they would not otherwise have 
jurisdiction. Moreover, this Part draws attention to the circularity of  arbitral 
courts both lending legitimacy to a state that international commercial 
parties might not otherwise fully trust and also borrowing power from the 
state to bind third parties and make law.  
A second boundary test comes from the arbitral court practice of  giving 
parties more control over choosing procedures, including control over 
whether the proceedings and court decisions will be kept confidential. It 
seems likely that arbitral courts will generously grant parties’ requests for 
confidentiality, especially over time. Arbitral courts’ institutional norms, like 
those in arbitration, seem focused on catering to parties’ interests—parties’ 
requests for efficiency, expertise, and other features they typically find in 
arbitration. When given the option, parties often prefer confidential 
proceedings. As is the case in international arbitration, however, allowing 
the parties to have control over confidentiality determinations can 
undermine strong and interrelated institutional interests in transparency, 
legitimacy, and independence.32 Crossing the confidentiality line should be 
the breaking point of  party autonomy over procedure. Arbitral courts 
should police confidentiality requests vigilantly to ensure their own legal and 
sociological legitimacy; to justify their public funding, support, and power; 
and to ensure their ability to perform the functions of  courts, including 
declaring and developing the law for the parties before them and for others. 
Third, arbitral court judges also test the limits of  public and private 
adjudication, especially in arbitral courts that hire foreign judges. These 
decision makers have a hybrid set of  incentives, and potentially a hybrid 
ethos—reflecting their role as decision makers hired by the state to cater to 
                                               
31. See infra Part III.  
32. See infra Part IV. 
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private parties’ needs and desires. This Part identifies questions for further 
research about arbitral court judges’ attitudes and incentive structures.  
Part V evaluates the perils and promise of  arbitral courts. It warns of  
the legitimacy problems that could follow if  arbitral courts proceed behind 
the dark veil of  confidentiality. Liberal granting of  parties’ requests for 
confidentiality could compromise not only the decisions made in particular 
cases but also arbitral courts’ ability to develop law and shape global 
governance. This Part identifies arbitral courts’ potential for developing 
transnational commercial law—if  they contain the scope of  their power 
within legitimate limits and if  they can resist parties’ preferences for 
confidentiality. It therefore offers suggestions for how and why arbitral 
courts might resist the temptation to keep proceedings private.  
Part VI concludes with an agenda of  further research questions. 
II. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF ARBITRATION AND THE PRIVATIZATION 
OF PROCEDURE  
Courts and arbitration represent the public and private sides of  the 
binding dispute resolution coin. Traditionally, the two sides are thought to 
offer contrasting options that differ significantly from each other in terms 
of  procedure, subject matter, decisionmakers, cost, speed, and more. A 
growing theme in contemporary procedural scholarship, however, is 
convergence.33 Procedures in arbitration and litigation are converging. 
Arbitration, especially international commercial arbitration, is judicializing.34 
Procedure in courts around the world, meanwhile, is growing privatized, 
through increased managerial roles of  judges, encouraging private 
settlement;35 incorporation of  arbitration and alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) as off-ramps to court process;36 and increased acceptance for 
privately negotiated procedures within courts.37  
                                               
33. See, e.g., Alyssa King, Global Civil Procedure, HARV. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2021).  
34. See, e.g., STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 84; Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 
supra note 16, at 1169; Gerbay, supra note 15, at 227. 
35. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982); Tobias Wolff, 
Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1027-28 (2013).  
36. Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s 
Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1652 (2015); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: 
How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 
166-67 (2003); Solomon Oliver Jr., Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Minorities in the Federal Courts, 
39 CAP. U. L. REV. 805, 806 (2011). 
37. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005); David 
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 391-92; Robin Effron, Ousted, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 127, 128 (2018); Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2012); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: 
An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1494 (2013). 
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And yet, certain differences should remain. Fundamentally, arbitration 
is a private institution and courts are public.  
This Part sets the stage for understanding the emergence of  arbitral 
courts by differentiating between the perceived distinctions between courts 
and arbitration (e.g., speed, cost, procedural formality), and the fundamental 
distinctions: the public and private sources of  their authority and legitimacy, 
and the resulting limitations on the power of  courts and arbitral tribunals. 
This Part then explores the literature on the judicialization of  arbitration 
and the privatization of  procedure. Both of  these latter trends reflect a 
convergence of  procedures between traditionally public and private binding 
dispute resolution mechanisms, but with arbitration and courts mostly 
staying in their own lanes. Judicialized arbitration is still self-evidently 
arbitration, not a public, domestic judicial system; privatized procedure does 
not morph courts into arbitral tribunals. Arbitral courts—the subject of  the 
rest of  this Article—present an apex of  this convergence: domestic courts 
that seek to mimic arbitration to new extremes, potentially erasing the 
boundary between arbitration and litigation, and raising existential questions 
about what courts are. 
A. Traditional Distinctions between Courts and Arbitration 
Both the Supreme Court and commentators routinely depict litigation 
and arbitration as starkly contrasting options for binding dispute 
resolution.38 They tend to focus on certain sets of  perceived differences. For 
example, arbitration is said to be faster, cheaper, more efficient, more expert, 
and less formal than litigation in court.39 Courts and arbitration are thought 
to have different procedures40 and to adjudicate different kinds of  
disputes.41 But these are not, contrary to the Supreme Court’s description, 
inherent differences between the two methods. Arbitration can be slow, 
expensive, and procedurally complicated. In the United States especially, 
                                               
38. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 11, at 3023; Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, 
at 1123; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (distinguishing between arbitration and 
the litigation procedures that arbitration “was meant to replace”). 
39. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1141-42 (discussing Supreme 
Court cases).  
40. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (arbitration’s “essential 
virtue” is resolving disputes without appellate review); Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1623 (considering 
individualized proceedings to be fundamental to arbitration); IAN MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
LAW § 34.1 (1994) (parties choose arbitration because it lacks discovery). 
41. See, e.g., Deborah Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the Scope 
of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 
381, 386 (2018). But cf. David L. Noll, Response: Public Litigation, Private Arbitration?, 18 NEV. L.J. 477, 
479 (2018) (challenging this view). 
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arbitration can adjudicate almost everything that can be heard in court.42 
Courts, meanwhile, are working on offering the kind of  efficiency and 
expertise, etc., that are commonly associated with arbitration.  
At their core, the difference is that courts are public and arbitration is 
private. Courts’ public nature means that courts should be open to the 
public—available to all comers to use them, to read their decisions, to 
observe their proceedings. They employ judges paid by the state whose role 
is to be public servants—adjudicating not just for the parties but with the 
public good in mind.43  
Both courts and arbitral tribunals are attentive to their own legitimacy. 
Of  course, legitimacy is a complex concept. To function, both courts and 
arbitral tribunals need the public—and their users—to perceive them as 
playing an appropriate role in governance and making decisions based on 
law, not politics or personal preferences.44 Put another way, both courts and 
arbitration need both sociological legitimacy and legal legitimacy. The 
sociological legitimacy of  a court depends on whether the public views the 
court as worthy of  respect and obedience.45 Legal legitimacy is established 
if  citizens believe the legal institution has a valid claim to exercise power.46 
Courts’ legitimacy is intertwined with the fact that courts are arms of  
the state.47 They derive their powers from the state’s sovereignty, which, in 
turn, defines the scope of  the court’s legitimate powers. The state’s 
sovereignty enables courts to render decisions that make law, to issue 
injunctions, and to assert power over any persons over whom they have 
personal jurisdiction. But the source of  authority also limits courts’ powers. 
Law students may be well familiar with domestic law limits on the powers 
of  federal courts. The Constitution may also impose some limits on state 
courts, for example, requiring public access.48 Sovereignty also limits court 
                                               
42. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1187. 
43. This is a description of the idealized role, not necessarily the reality. See, e.g., POUND INST. 
FOR CIV. JUST., DANGEROUS SECRETS: CONFRONTING CONFIDENTIALITY IN OUR PUBLIC COURTS 
(2020), https://tinyurl.com/y3hnyl4v; Paul L. Friedman, Threats to Judicial Independence and the Rule of 
Law, A.B.A. (Nov. 18, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/ybv8jn6u.  
44. See RICHARD H. FALLON JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 23 (2018). 
45. Id. at 22-23. 
46. See, e.g., Jonathan Jackson, Norms, Normativity, and the Legitimacy of Justice Institutions: International 
Perspectives, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 145, 149 (2018). There may also be questions of moral 
legitimacy, which ask whether people ought to respect and try to obey the law “or whether 
governmental officials are morally justified in coercing compliance.” FALLON, supra note 44, at 23.  
47. Scholars have long grappled with the intricacies of the concept of legitimacy and this Article 
does not try to engage in those debates so much as to try to apply the basic ideas of legitimacy to 
arbitral courts. 
48. See infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Constitution requires 
open access in civil cases). As another example, on October 5, 2020, the Supreme Court heard a case 
asking whether the Constitution allows state court judges to be appointed or dismissed due to political 
party affiliation. Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. _ (2020). For the lower court’s discussion of the issue, see 
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powers on the international plane.49 For example, for a foreign court to 
recognize and enforce another court’s judgment, the rendering court must 
have had jurisdiction over the case.  
In recognition of  the awesome state power that courts wield, states 
require courts to maintain standards of  fairness and due process by 
requiring certain kinds of  procedures and a certain amount of  open access 
for the public to keep tabs on what courts are doing (among other reasons).  
Arbitration, by contrast, is private. It is held in private spaces. It excludes 
strangers from proceedings. Parties can (but do not have to) agree not to 
disclose their relationship or the arbitration’s outcome to third parties.50 
Arbitral awards are made by private decision-makers who are paid by the 
parties, follow procedures chosen by the parties, and bind only the parties 
to the dispute. Excepting specialized regimes where parties are required by 
law to arbitrate, arbitrators’ authority over a particular dispute derives 
principally from—and is limited by—those parties’ private choices. 
Arbitrators therefore also may have a different attitude toward decision-
making. Their task is to resolve the dispute before them. Accordingly, some 
suggest arbitrators may be less interested in “making law”; as providers of  
a business service, they may be guided by commercial reasonableness as 
much as, if  not more than, the governing law.51  
Arbitration’s legitimacy derives from at least three sources: the 
arbitration agreement (the parties’ consent), an international infrastructure 
undergirded by state support,52 and the virtues and reputations of  the 
arbitrators themselves.53 First, the private source of  arbitration’s legitimacy 
is from the parties’ agreement to resolve disputes arising out of  their 
contract in arbitration. But freedom of  contract alone does not legitimize 
                                               
Adams v. Governor of Del., 914 F.3d 827, 829 (3d Cir. 2019). 
49. According to the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
customary international law does not confine courts’ judicial jurisdiction. This is a change from the 
Third Restatement. See Pamela K. Bookman, Towards the Fifth Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law: 
The Future of Adjudicative Jurisdiction Under Public International Law, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND: 
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(2020). But it is uncontroversial that customary international law constrains courts’ enforcement 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hannah Buxbaum & Ralf Michaels, Reasonableness as a Limitation on the 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: From 403 to 405, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND: THE 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2020).   
50. See, e.g., Gu Weixia, Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in International Commercial Arbitration?, 
15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 609 (2004). 
51. See JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW 40-78, 99-114 (2013). 
52. Id. at 70. 
53. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 45 
(1996); Thomas Schultz & Robert Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators? Fifteen Years after 
Dezalay and Garth, 28 ARB. INT’L 161, 166 (2012). 
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international commercial arbitration. An international treaty, the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, established a legal infrastructure for courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements, recognize and enforce arbitration awards, and aid arbitration 
when a proceeding requires interim measures or injunctive relief  that arbitral 
tribunals lack the power to authorize.54 Over 150 countries have signed this 
treaty, and it is largely an international law success story.55 Thus, arbitration’s 
power derives not only from contract but also from the active consent and 
support of  many states—both the seat of  the arbitration and the states 
where enforcement is sought.56 That infrastructure reinforces the point: a 
key distinction between courts and arbitration is the source of  their power. 
Finally, arbitrators also lend considerable legitimacy to arbitration. 
Arbitrators appear more neutral because they are not state actors and 
possibly do not share a nationality with one of  the parties, in contrast to 
judges on traditional courts. Many arbitrators are well regarded experts in 
their fields. Moreover, they are chosen by the parties, and therefore even the 
losing party has helped constitute the tribunal and may feel like it had an 
advocate during the decision-making process. The chair of  an arbitration 
panel—the third arbitrator chosen by the parties’ chosen co-arbitrators57—
also has legitimacy based on the fact that they represent a choice acceptable 
to arbitrators presumed to act in the interest of  the parties who selected 
them. 
The sources of  arbitration’s legitimacy both define and limit the scope 
of  its jurisdiction and authority. Because arbitration is “a creature of  
contract,”58 parties have the freedom to control which procedures apply, 
which state’s law (if  any) the arbitrators should use to resolve the dispute, 
and whether their process or the arbitrator’s conclusions should be kept 
confidential. Similarly, because arbitration is only a creature of  contract, 
arbitrators are limited to resolving the dispute before them as defined by the 
contract; their authority extends only to those parties that have consented 
to arbitration; and they cannot enforce their own awards or exercise the 
injunctive powers of  the state without a court’s assistance.  
                                               
54. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1137. 
55. See Martinez, supra note 10, at 441 (calling the New York Convention “one of the great 
successes of international law”). 
56. See, e.g., JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (2013) (theorizing arbitration’s 
authority as based on multiple sources, including parties’ freedom of contract and state power); see also 
EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010) (theorizing 
arbitration as an autonomous legal order). 
57. In most high stakes arbitral disputes, “each party names a ‘co-arbitrator,’ who then jointly 
select[] a ‘presiding arbitrator’.” STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 224. 
58. See Alan Scott Rau, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.: Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 469, 472 (2006). 
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Daniel Markovits has argued that it is important to recognize that 
arbitration is not one thing but two—a private replacement for judging and 
a form of  contract gap-filling. He criticizes “arbitration’s most enthusiastic 
defenders, including the Supreme Court,” for justifying the expansion of  
arbitration’s scope (for example enforcing arbitration clauses in consumer 
or employment contracts) on the rationale that arbitration is merely a 
replacement for judging, but then conceiving of  arbitration as merely an 
extension of  the parties’ contract, completely manipulable by private parties, 
when arbitration defenders try to “relax the law’s scrutiny of  the actual 
arbitral process.”59 In other countries that are more attentive to these dual 
roles, one finds more external limits on arbitration’s scope. For example, in 
the EU, arbitration clauses in consumer or employment contracts are not 
enforceable, and in Switzerland, courts can decline to enforce arbitral awards 
if  the arbitral proceeding violated standards of  due process, including letting 
both sides be heard.60  
As these examples show, arbitration, like other kinds of  private ordering, 
is to varying extents regulated by the state; even under the New York 
Convention there are grounds for not enforcing arbitral awards, for example 
if  they are a result of  fraud or if  they exceeded the authority granted by the 
parties. But such interventions, especially in international commercial 
arbitration, are the exception rather than the rule. Some theorists even 
conceive of  international arbitration as an independent “transnational legal 
order,”61 seemingly denying the possibility of  state regulation external to the 
private arbitration process. But regardless of  arbitration’s autonomous 
status, any given dispute’s parameters are still defined by the scope of  the 
private arbitration agreement. 
B. Judicializing Arbitration  
With respect to many of  the so-called differences between them, courts 
and arbitral tribunals adjudicating international commercial disputes have 
been converging over the past few decades. In that time, international 
arbitration has exploded in terms of  the number of  cases, amounts in 
controversy, and reported popularity.62 As arbitration centers like the 
                                               
59. Markovits, supra note 12, at 434. 
60. Violation of Due Process, SWISS INT’L ARB. DECISIONS, https://tinyurl.com/y59dd2ec (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2021); Tribunal fédérale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 10, 2007, 26 ASA BULL. 
322 (Switz.); Remy Gerbay, Due Process Paranoia, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 6, 2016), 
https://tinyurl.com/y2s6dogb. 
61. GAILLARD, supra note 56, at 35. 
62. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 2-3 (collecting statistics); Horst Eidenmuller, The 
Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational Corporations, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 707, 722-23 (2011). Some empirical studies of contracts cast doubt on proclamations of 
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International Chamber of  Commerce (ICC) have gained prominence, they 
have also become sites of  increasingly contentious, high stakes, and 
complicated disputes. And they have been populated by lawyers trained in 
American litigation tactics.  
Scholars have cited all of  these trends in explaining why and how 
international arbitration has become increasingly “judicialized.”63 In the 
early twentieth century, proponents of  arbitration “touted [it] as a more 
efficient, less costly, and more final method for resolving disputes,” with 
“little or no discovery, motion practice, judicial review, or other trappings of  
litigation.”64 But by the start of  this century, international arbitration had 
become increasingly similar to civil litigation—more “formal, costly, time-
consuming, and subject to hardball advocacy.”65 Arbitration centers now 
have lengthy and sophisticated codes of  procedure,66 including options for 
discovery,67 class proceedings68 and internal appellate review.69 A new 
generation of  arbitrator also increasingly sees their role as similar to that of  
a managerial judge.70 
Some kinds of  arbitration have also become more transparent. In 
certain areas, for example, particularly investor-state arbitration, tribunals 
now publish most awards.71 As a result, these arbitral awards have 
                                               
arbitration’s total market dominance. See, e.g., Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! The Lack of 
Arbitration Clauses In International Commercial Contracts, 58 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 6 (2019); Christopher 
A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L 
L. 449, 475 (2009); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008); 
Christopher Drahozal & Stephen Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses, 25 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 434 (2010). 
63. See STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25 (developing a theoretical framework to explain 
judicialization in terms of supporting arbitration’s legitimacy and other functional factors); Aragaki, 
supra note 16, at 552 (explaining judicialization as a response to legitimacy concerns); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (quoting lawyers blaming 
litigators for arbitration’s judicialization); id. at 11 (faulting the increasing complexity of arbitration 
disputes). 
64. Stipanowich, New Litigation, supra note 63, at 8. 
65. Id. As I have explored elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s characterizations of arbitration even 
today hew closer to the early twentieth century caricature. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 
supra note 16, at 1150-63 (describing the Court’s “essentialist view” of arbitration). 
66. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 84. 
67. See, e.g., Giacomo Elgueta, Understanding Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration through 
‘Behavioral Law and Economics,’ 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165 (2011). 
68. See Alyssa King, Too Much Power and Not Enough: Arbitrators Face the Class Dilemma, 21 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1031 (2017). 
69. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, OPTIONAL APPELLATE ARBITRATION RULES 3 (2013), 
https://tinyurl.com/y6nah3x9. 
70. Schultz & Kovacs, supra note 53, at 162. 
71. See, e.g., Hensler & Khatam, supra note 41, at 412 (describing ICSID’s efforts to expand 
transparency). 
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contributed to developing the substantive law in this area, and arbitral 
awards are often cited in a quasi-precedential fashion.72  
In international commercial arbitration, however, there is resistance to 
this last step of  judicialization. Confidentiality continues to reign supreme, 
especially in terms of  publication of  awards.73 The arbitration institutions 
seem to acknowledge a need to provide transparency into their procedures 
and reasoning, but parties often choose arbitration specifically to keep their 
business disputes—and other information about their businesses—
confidential. There have been several efforts to address the “confidentiality-
transparency problem” without sacrificing that allegiance to 
confidentiality.74 The ICC has been issuing redacted awards since the 1930s; 
some other arbitration houses have begun doing so;75 some say they would 
publish upon the parties’ request, but have never published any awards.76 It 
is not surprising that if  publication decisions are left entirely to the parties, 
however, few or no awards will be published.77 Practical considerations also 
impede robust publication—who covers the cost of  publishing the awards 
and of  redacting them to preserve the parties’ autonomy?  
Within the world of  multinational businesses, law firms, lawyers, and 
arbitrators who use or operate it, international commercial arbitration 
nevertheless enjoys a high level of  perceived legitimacy.78 Some scholars 
have criticized adherence to confidentiality as undermining the legitimacy 
of  international commercial arbitration, “the arbitral order’s own claims to 
operate in the public interest,”79 and arbitration’s ability to contribute to the 
development of  substantive law. They argue that as a private, largely self-
regulating instrument of  global governance, international commercial 
                                               
72. See, e.g., Mark Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1895 (2010) (noting that this trend is prevalent in investor-state arbitration, but much less so in 
international commercial arbitration).  
73. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 228. 
74. See, e.g., Mary Zhao, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration: Adopting a Balanced 
Approach, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 175 (2019) (arguing for more transparency in international commercial 
arbitration); Joshua Karton, A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way Forward on Publication of International 
Arbitral Awards, 28 ARB. INT’L 447 (2012) (exploring the conflict between party and systemic interests 
in transparency); Catherine Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1301 (2006) (arguing for nationally imposed disclosure obligations in international commercial 
arbitration). 
75. For example, the AAA-ICDR and the SIAC began publishing redacted awards in 2012. See 
STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229. 
76. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229 (describing the LCIA and the HKIAC). 
77. See Karton, A Conflict of Interests, supra note 74 (exploring parties’ interests in confidentiality of 
arbitration). 
78. See, e.g., STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 219. 
79. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229. 
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arbitration must defend its legitimacy against detractors.80 It can be difficult 
to do so if  the proceedings and results are all cloaked in secrecy.  
Arbitration is often praised for its flexibility and adaptability.81 
Judicialization can be understood as showcasing, rather than undermining 
these attributes.82 As a private legal ordering, arbitration is responsive to 
users’ needs and desires. These forces have likely driven judicialization to 
some extent, but they have stopped short at eliminating confidentiality in 
international commercial arbitration. Confidentiality is not an inherent trait 
of  international commercial arbitration, but confidentiality is likely to 
endure because of  parties’ needs and desires,83 despite whatever institutional 
costs in terms of  legitimacy and efforts for international commercial 
arbitration to shape and develop substantive law. 
C. Privatizing Procedure 
At the same time that arbitration has been judicializing, courts—
especially in the common law world—have been privatizing. This trend has 
occurred along several vectors, including managerial judges, court-annexed 
arbitration, and party-driven procedures.84 Overall, public adjudication in 
courts has become more private and more privatized: the workings of  courts 
are more hidden from public view and more controlled by party preferences.  
First, the judge’s role in the United States and elsewhere85 has 
transformed from one running public trials to one managing cases and 
                                               
80. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Legitimacy and International Arbitration: An Alternate View, KLUWER ARB. 
BLOG (Oct. 4, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6xyk9xx; S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky 
Defaults, Status Quo Bias, and the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived Legitimacy of International Arbitration, 
2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 533. For scholarship engaging in the legitimacy “debate,” see, for example, 
GUILHERME RIZZO AMARAL, JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND ARBITRATION – ARE ARBITRATORS 
BOUND BY JUDICIAL PRECEDENT? 79 (2d ed. 2018); Stephan Schill, Conceptions of Legitimacy of 
International Arbitration, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (David D. 
Caron et al. eds., 2015); David D. Caron et al., An Introduction, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015) (noting that as “[i]nternational 
arbitration has become an institution that contributes to the shaping of law,” and international 
arbitrators “contribute to the progressive development of transnational law,” concerns about 
arbitration’s legitimacy have risen). 
81. See, e.g., Stipanowich, New Litigation, supra note 63, at 51 (calling flexibility arbitration’s key 
feature). 
82. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 169; cf. Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 
supra note 16, at 1124 (criticizing view of arbitration as having certain “essential” procedural features).  
83. See STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229 (predicting that arbitration houses are 
unlikely to make awards public in light of party preferences). 
84. See, e.g., Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 37; see also, e.g., Hoffman, Whither Bespoke 
Procedure, supra note 37; Effron, supra note 37; Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Bone, supra note 37; Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 37. 
85. THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania 
Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013); SARAH MURRAY, THE REMAKING OF THE COURTS: LESS-
ADVERSARIAL PRACTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AUSTRALIA 
 
178 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 61:2 
promoting private settlement.86 The traditional trial held in open court has 
all but disappeared,87 replaced by in camera conferences that are harder, or 
impossible, for third parties to observe or learn about.88 The reduction in 
the prevalence of  trials corresponds to a reduction in the prevalence of  
traditional forms of  open court proceedings and precedent because disputes 
are instead increasingly resolved through settlement, negotiation, and other 
procedures that take place away from public view. 
Second, arbitration and ADR have in some places replaced court 
procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court’s liberal approach towards arbitration 
clauses in consumer and employment contracts pushes large quantities of  
disputes either towards arbitration or away from dispute resolution 
altogether.89 In addition, experiments beginning in the 1970s allowed or 
required courts to push parties into non-binding arbitration.90 These state 
court experiments varied in their particulars, but the basic idea was that 
courts either encouraged or forced parties to arbitrate their disputes in order 
to clear court dockets and ideally to foster faster and cheaper claim 
settlement.91 Court-annexed arbitration was private and confidential on the 
reasoning that secrecy facilitates negotiation and settlement.92 These 
processes are, importantly, not the same as arbitral courts—the arbitration 
proceedings were an off-ramp, rather than conducted by the judge herself, 
and results were not binding.93 If  parties were unsatisfied with the court-
annexed arbitration, they still had recourse to the court and its regular (if  
slow) public procedures.94 
                                               
(2014). 
86. Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 5, at 1806. 
87. Thomas Stipanowich, ADR and the Vanishing Trial: The Growth and Impact of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination 
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).  
88. See Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 5; cf. Moon, supra note 18, at 1440 n.175 (noting 
that lawyers gain useful knowledge of Delaware courts’ inner workings from experience in camera and 
purchased transcripts of court statements made during bench trials or motion practice).  
89. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the 
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of 
Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate 
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012).  
90. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 36, at 178; see also ADR Overview, NYCOURTS.GOV, 
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/ny/ADR_overview.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2021). 
91. See, e.g., Resnik, Contingency of Openness, supra note 36, at 1655 (describing these processes).  
92. See id. 
93. In this respect they seem similar to the current structure of the Chinese International 
Commercial Courts, although the ADR off-ramps in that setting may be binding. See Wei Cai & Andrew 
Godwin, Challenges and Opportunities for the China International Commercial Court, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 
869 (2019). 
94. In some states, there was a sanction if the result in court turned out to be less favorable than 
what the party had attained in the court-annexed procedure. Resnick, Contingency of Openness, supra note 
36, at 1655.  
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Third, many scholars have charted the rise of  party control over court 
procedures, sometimes known as “private procedural ordering.”95 In the 
early twentieth century, courts would often not allow party control even in 
the form of  forum-selection clauses and choice-of-law clauses, which were 
seen as illegitimate attempts to “oust” courts of  jurisdiction.96 By the middle 
of  the last century, most courts had ousted ouster.97 Parties had increasing 
control over their choice of  forum, choice of  substantive law governing 
their contractual relationships, and ultimately, choice of  procedures.98 
III. ARBITRAL COURTS 
The judicialization of  arbitration and the privatization of  procedure 
reveal that public and private adjudication in courts and arbitration have 
been converging over time. But courts and arbitral tribunals are not the 
same. Courts are part of  the state. They are public institutions. They remain 
primarily open to the public, with a public source of  authority and funding 
and the powers of  injunctive relief  and compulsory jurisdiction, as well as 
the ability to make and develop law. Arbitration is a private institution, 
primarily controlled by the parties. Arbitral tribunals lack many of  the 
powers of  public courts. But arbitration offers parties extensive possibilities 
for personalizing their preferred dispute resolution mechanism, including by 
keeping it secret.  
Arbitral courts test these public/private boundaries. To show how, this 
Part offers a definition of  an arbitral court, outlines its common features, 
and examines five representative examples of  arbitral courts around the 
world.  
A. Defining Arbitral Courts 
Arbitral courts are domestic courts that challenge the fundamental 
public/private divide that separates arbitration and courts as sites of  binding 
adjudication. Thus, arbitral courts are courts that put their public-ness in the 
hands of  the parties—e.g., by allowing them to opt into confidentiality, to 
choose which procedural or substantive rules to follow or to avoid, and to 
harness the power of  the state to extend beyond the limits of  their 
                                               
95. See, e.g., Effron, supra note 37, at 129 n.1 (collecting scholarship). 
96. Id. at 128; John Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 COLO. L. REV. 1147 (2020) 
(noting early limits on parties’ ability to choose the law governing their contracts).  
97. Effron, supra note 37, at 128. 
98. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 37, at 1330; Bookman & Noll, supra note 30, at 777-96 (describing 
parties’ roles in developing procedures to address unexpected situations in litigation); cf. Hoffman, 
Bespoke Procedure, supra note 37, at 389 (documenting the limited circumstances under which parties 
actually contract for special procedures).  
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contractual agreements. They are designed to offer some combination of  
the traits of  arbitration and courts that are perceived as most attractive. 
This Section identifies the characteristic features of  arbitral courts, some 
of  which are common to all of  the case studies that follow, and some of  
which are typical but not necessarily found in each example of  an arbitral 
court. Regardless of  the precise collection of  arbitration-like characteristics, 
arbitral courts reveal a trend that extends even beyond recognized ways in 
which courts, even commercial courts, have been catering to private parties 
and their disputes, mimicking arbitration, and, as we shall see, potentially 
neglecting their roles as public institutions. 
Arbitral courts are (1) domestic courts that have the following 
arbitration-like characteristics: they (2) allow party autonomy over 
procedures, (3) permit parties to opt into confidentiality, (4) exercise 
jurisdiction based on consent, often without further connections to the 
locality, and (5) proceed in English. They often (6) employ well paid foreign 
judges who may moonlight as arbitrators, (7) use three-judge panels, 
(8) offer opportunities for foreign lawyers to appear without local counsel, 
(9) allow parties to opt out of  the right to appeal, and (10) are willing to 
enforce parties’ selection of  non-state law to govern their dispute. 
First, arbitral courts are domestic courts.99 They often handle cross-
border disputes and have high amount in controversy requirements. They 
are specialized, affording the expertise that arbitration offers.100 This 
subject-matter specialization tends to mean that, like international 
commercial arbitration, arbitral courts adjudicate “private” rather than 
“public” disputes. But these limits are not entirely clear, and nor is the line 
between public and private disputes. The Singapore and Dutch examples 
allow referral jurisdiction by local courts of  more general jurisdiction—that 
is, the ordinary courts may refer a case to the specialized arbitral court that 
focuses on international commercial disputes. The Cayman Islands court 
allows more public minded proceedings, such as insolvency. Many disputes 
in international commercial arbitration include states and state-related 
entities;101 arbitral courts may see their fair share of  such disputes in the 
future. Moreover, even entirely “private” suits, when adjudicated in courts, 
take on a public dimension, for the court is exercising the power of  the state 
and making binding law.  
Second, arbitral courts allow considerable party control over 
procedures. Some argue that arbitration’s hallmark is its procedural 
                                               
99. As noted in the Introduction, arbitral courts are not international institutions; they do not 
hear disputes between states; they do not implicate the same theoretical questions that international 
“courts of arbitration” tend to raise. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
100. See, e.g., Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004, art. 5; SICC PROCEDURAL GUIDE at 4.  
101. See Born, New Generation, supra note 27, at 827.  
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flexibility.102 In arbitral courts, parties can opt out of  default procedural and 
evidentiary rules, sometimes including the opportunity to appeal. In 
common law courts, it is not uncommon for parties to contract over 
procedures or agree to procedural deviations in certain contexts.103 But the 
exceptional party autonomy in arbitral courts goes a step beyond these 
trends in an attempt to offer arbitration’s characteristic flexibility. 
Traditionally, parties cannot opt out of  procedure or evidence rules whole 
hog, nor can they opt into confidential proceedings, or out of  appellate 
review. Arbitral courts allow such choices. Several arbitral courts’ default 
procedural rules are often borrowed directly from model arbitration rules, 
which offer defaults but also allow for considerable party choice.104 
Third, arbitral courts allow parties to opt into confidentiality. All of  
these courts are relatively new, and for some, the standards for granting 
confidentiality requests are still uncertain. In Delaware, the offer of  
confidentiality was virtually absolute. More commonly, arbitral courts offer 
confidentiality based on varying standards that often seem not difficult to 
meet if  both parties join the request, and potentially even without such 
agreement.105  
Fourth, arbitral courts’ jurisdiction is principally based on consent—
whether in a contract’s forum-selection clause or by incorporating in an 
offshore territory—with no or minimal additional connection to the forum. 
The Delaware arbitral court required at least one party to be a Delaware 
entity and the Cayman Islands functionally has a similar requirement. In 
both of  those places, foreigners can easily incorporate and register entities 
and thereby bring transnational disputes to the local courts. The other 
examples, mirroring arbitration, do not require a local connection. But, 
unlike arbitration, an arbitral court’s jurisdiction and powers are not limited 
by the parties’ consent—that is, even under consent-based jurisdiction, 
arbitral courts still can do what arbitration cannot, including join third 
parties, consolidate claims, and issue injunctive relief.106 After all, a major 
                                               
102. Stipanowich, New Litigation, supra note 62, at 1-2 (“The most important difference between 
arbitration and litigation—and the fundamental value of arbitration—is the ability of users to tailor 
processes to serve particular needs.”); Jivraj v. Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, [61] (appeal taken from 
EWCA Civ.) (“One of the distinguishing features of arbitration that sets it apart from proceedings in 
national courts is the breadth of discretion left to the parties and the arbitrator to structure the process 
for resolution of the dispute.”). 
103. See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 37, at 653; Effron, supra note 37, at 149-50. But cf. 
Dodson, supra note 84, at 2-4.  
104. See, e.g., Matthew S. Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial 
Dispute Resolution, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. 225, 248 (2020). 
105. See Zhengxin Huo & Man Yip, Comparing the International Commercial Courts of China with the 
Singapore International Commercial Court, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 903, 938 (2019) (discussing 
confidentiality in SICC). 
106. See Drossos Stamboulakis & Blake Crook, Joinder of Non-Consenting Parties: The Singapore 
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advantage that courts have over arbitration is the ability to exercise the 
power of  the state.  
Fifth, arbitral courts, like arbitration, proceed in English, which is 
remarkable in places where that is not the national language, such as the 
Netherlands and Dubai.107 The adoption of  the English language disrupts 
common assumptions about the importance of  local culture in procedure,108 
and allowing English-language proceedings sometimes has required 
legislative or even constitutional amendments to existing judicial 
structures.109 But it also reflects apparent assumptions that parties choose 
arbitration because of  the availability of  proceeding in English. Survey 
responders rarely cite English language availability as a main attraction of  
arbitration,110 but in contexts where English is the common language 
between two non-English speaking parties, the possibility of  proceeding in 
English may be a significant draw.111 
Sixth, the judges on arbitral courts are often foreign citizens or former 
foreign judges who are well paid and sometimes also serve as arbitrators.112 
Many arbitral courts include judges who are not nationals of  the forum 
state. A major draw of  arbitration is not just the expertise of  the decision-
makers but their apparent neutrality. This feature is particularly important in 
transnational disputes, where the parties may be from different countries 
and different legal traditions. Such parties often choose arbitrators who are 
not co-nationals of  either party; they may be wary of  national courts and in 
particular judges who might be biased in favor of  local parties.  
                                               
International Commercial Court Approach Meets Transnational Recognition and Enforcement, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 
98 (2019); Sir Rupert Jackson, Arbitrator, Lecture for the Qatar Conference: A Comparative 
Perspective to Hybrid Dispute Resolution Fora 5 (Nov. 18, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y5mjlnhp 
(noting most international commercial courts allow joinder, and the AIFC court allows joinder “if it is 
desirable”). Joinder is not readily available in arbitration. See S.I. Strong, Third Party Intervention and Joinder 
as of Right in International Arbitration, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 915, 918 (1998). 
107. Other arbitral courts that operate in English in non-English-speaking countries include the 
Astana International Financial Centre Court, the Qatar International Court, and the Abu Dhabi Global 
Markets Court. 
108. See OSCAR CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-
CULTURAL CONTEXT 2 (2005). 
109. See, for example, the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) and the Netherlands 
Commercial Court (NCC) discussed infra Part III.B. Belgium’s attempted arbitral court required 
considerable legislative gymnastics to circumvent traditional language requirements. Erik Peetermans 
& Phillippe Lambrecht, The Brussels International Business Court, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 42 (2015).  
110. See 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, QUEEN MARY 
UNIV. OF LONDON SCH. OF INT’L ARB. 2 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/yxdzrjnx (listing enforceability, 
avoiding specific legal systems, flexibility, and ability to select arbitrators as the main attractions of 
arbitration (not English language opportunities)). 
111. Thanks to Josh Karton for raising this point. 
112. For example, Beverly McLachlin, the former Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court, 
sits on the Singapore International Commercial Court as well as the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal; 
she is also an arbitrator and mediator at Arbitration Place in Toronto. Julius Melnitzer, Former High 
Court Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin to Join Arbitration Firm, NAT’L POST, July 25, 2018, at FP1.  
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In addition to neutrality, arbitral court judges also offer subject-matter 
expertise and bring their personal integrity to the process, like arbitrators. In 
Delaware and the Netherlands, the availability of  local judges is thought to 
be a selling point; Delaware and Dutch judges have a reputation for expertise 
and fairness. They may be attractive as neutral fora, therefore, to non-U.S. 
or Dutch entities, although they may not be the first choice in a dispute 
involving citizens of  those countries. In Dubai, Singapore, and the Cayman 
Islands, the courts have hired foreign jurists in addition to local members of  
the bench.113 These judges’ expertise, neutrality, and integrity add to the 
perceived legitimacy of  the new courts, much as arbitrators’ “virtue” 
supports the legitimacy of  the arbitration system.114  
Also like arbitrators, arbitral court judges are likely handsomely paid, 
although, like arbitrators (and unlike judges), in general, their salaries may 
not be publicly available.115 The Dutch courts endeavor to be “self-funding,” 
i.e., funded entirely by parties’ fees.116 The Delaware experiment also 
contemplated large fees compared to ordinary litigation.117 It does not 
appear that those fees would have directly supplemented judges’ salaries.118  
Seventh, the structure of  judging may also mirror arbitration. Many 
arbitral courts assign three-judge panels to adjudicate disputes, similar to 
arbitration (and to certain kinds of  U.S. litigation).119 To date, no arbitral 
courts allow parties to choose the particular judges who will sit on their 
panels.120 Instead, they compile a roster of  first-rate judges, many of  whom 
also serve as arbitrators, and assign those judges to cases. These assignments 
are not necessarily random; in the Singapore International Commercial 
Court (SICC), for example, a judge may be assigned to a case because of  her 
nationality (for expertise in the parties’ chosen substantive law).121 This 
                                               
113. Arbitral courts in Astana, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar have followed this trend. See, e.g., Tiba, supra 
note 24 (discussing the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre and the Abu Dhabi 
Global Market Courts); Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar, The Court of the Astana International Financial Center in 
the Wake of Its Persian Gulf Predecessors, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 122 (2019).  
114. See infra Part IV.A. 
115. It appears that SICC judges, like other Singapore trial-level judges, earn S$234,600 a year 
(approximately US$173,000), a number that seems generous, but also has not changed since 1994. See 
Judges’ Renumeration Act ch. 147, § 2(1) (1994) (Sing.) (statute listing judges’ salaries, available at 
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/SL/147-OR1); Sucheta Dasgupta, Salary Hike for Judges: Money Matters, INDIA 
LEGAL (Dec. 9, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y65bzdfx. 
116. The Brussels International Business Court (BIBC) also aspired to be self-funding. See 
Peetermans & Lambrecht, supra note 109, at 54. 
117. Chancery Court judges in Delaware make over $184,000 a year. S.B. 235, 149th Gen. 
Assemb. (Del. 2018). 
118. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012) (“[T]he 
Chancery Court judge and staff are paid their usual salaries for arbitration work.”). 
119. See, e.g., Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 252.  
120. In most high stakes arbitral disputes, “each party names a ‘co-arbitrator’ who then jointly 
selects a ‘presiding arbitrator’.” STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 224. 
121. Cf. Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the 
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system allows arbitral courts to compete with arbitration on speed; one 
complaint about high-profile international commercial arbitration is the 
delay involved with waiting for the availability of  arbitrators who are in 
particularly high demand. In theory, arbitral courts could allow parties to 
participate in the selection of  the judges on their cases—but no current 
arbitral court has such a practice. 
Eighth, many arbitral courts allow foreign lawyers to appear before 
them, as would be allowed in arbitration but usually not in domestic 
courts.122 The availability of  these opportunities may reveal whether the 
arbitral court wants to attract foreigners and foreign lawyers, or whether the 
focus is more on generating work for the local bar.123  
Ninth, another classic difference between arbitration and litigation is the 
availability of  appellate review on the merits.124 Some arbitral courts offer 
substantive appellate review to a specialized appellate body,125 some do not 
allow appellate review,126 and some allow the parties to choose in advance 
whether they want appellate review.127  
Finally, arbitral courts all enforce valid choice-of-law clauses, and some, 
like arbitration, enforce parties’ selection of  non-state law. That is, parties 
can choose to have their disputes governed by state law, like New York or 
German law, or they could choose a legal system that does not come from 
a state, for example, rules adopted by international bodies such as the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The 
Delaware statute specifically empowered the Delaware judges to grant any 
remedy that was in accordance with “general principles of  law and equity” 
                                               
Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015) (noting that judges are not selected based on 
the case, but challenging the assumption that judges are randomly assigned in the statistical sense). 
122. In the United States, foreign lawyers usually cannot appear in court if they are not admitted 
to the local bar or the bar in another U.S. state. See, e.g., David Spector & Jessica Romero, Arbitration 
and The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 13 ARIAS Q. U.S. 16, 16-19 (2006), https://tinyurl.com/yxly8sqg.  
123. For example, SICC and DIFC allow foreign lawyers to practice before them, but the NCC, 
Delaware, and Cayman Islands do not. For SICC, see Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1969, rev. 
ed. 2007, ch. 322 § 18M (Sing.), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/ACT/SCJA1969. For DIFC, see Jayanth K. 
Krishnan & Priya Purohit, A Common-Law Court in an Uncommon Environment: The DIFC Judiciary and 
Global Commercial Dispute Resolution, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 497, 529-30 (2014), and compare R. PROC. 
FOR NCC DIST. CT. & NCC CT. OF APPEAL art. 3.1.1, https://tinyurl.com/y4d8pmn5 (with 
exceptions, parties must be represented by members of the Dutch bar). For Delaware, see Del. Super. 
Ct. R. Civ. P. 90.1 (providing rules for admission pro hac vice for attorneys not members of the 
Delaware bar), and infra note 232 and accompanying text (noting local bar requirements for attorneys 
to appear before the Cayman Islands FSD).   
124. See Hall St. Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008); cf. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, 
supra note 25, at 229-30 (noting an increasing demand for appellate mechanisms within arbitration, and 
arbitration houses’ efforts to afford opportunities for appellate processes).  
125. See, for example, discussion of the NCC at infra Part III.B. 
126. See, for example, discussion of the BIBC, Delaware at infra Part III.B. 
127. See discussion of the NCC at infra Part III.B. 
 
2021] ARBITRAL COURTS 185 
that would be within the scope of  the parties’ agreement.128 Courts, by 
contrast, traditionally do not enforce choice-of-law clauses selecting non-
state law.129 
B. Case Studies 
This Section profiles prototypical arbitral courts from each of  the 
regions where states are experimenting with arbitral courts: the United 
States,130 Europe,131 Asia,132 the Middle East,133 and the Caribbean.134 The 
examples—from Delaware, the Netherlands, Singapore, Dubai, and the 
Cayman Islands—are some of  the most arbitration-like of  the commercial 
courts that have emerged in their respective regions. Delaware’s arbitral 
court was held unconstitutional, but the Dutch, Singaporean, Dubai, and 
Cayman courts are all in operation. These courts are all common-law courts 
except the Dutch example. Dubai, as part of  the United Arab Emirates, 
                                               
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 2020).  
129. See Geneviève Saumier, The Hague Principles and the Choice of Non-State “Rules of Law” to Govern 
an International Commercial Contract, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2014) (noting that courts’ choice-of-law 
rules typically “allow only the designation of State law”). 
130. Many U.S. states have opened business courts in recent decades, hoping to attract businesses 
to their states and to their courts, with limited success. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 21. In theory, a state 
situated outside the Third Circuit might try to establish a Delaware-inspired arbitral court and seek a 
different constitutional evaluation. 
131. International commercial courts have been proliferating in Europe, especially in the wake of 
the Brexit vote. Many of these courts, like the Chamber for International Commercial Disputes at the 
District Court Frankfurt/Main, are specialized chambers of existing courts that allow proceedings in 
English, but continue to use national judges and mostly national procedures. See also Eva Lein, 
International Commercial Courts in Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS 115 (Xandra 
Kramer & John Sorabji eds., 2019). See generally Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19 (describing 
these courts). The attempted Brussels International Business Court greatly resembled arbitration, but 
the legislation that would have created it never passed Parliament. Geert van Calster, The Brussels 
International Business Court, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS 107 (Xandra Kramer & John Sorabji 
eds., 2019). It was blocked by political opposition criticizing the proposed tribunal for being a “caviar 
court” catering to elites and neglecting the rest of the population. Matthias Verbergt, Controversiële 
‘kaviaarrechtbank’ van Geens wordt begraven, DE STANDAARD (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://tinyurl.com/y4len9n6.   
132. Legal hubs in Asia are expanding, offering litigation, arbitration, and mediation options and 
hybrids in single locations. See Erie, supra note 104. Other examples of arbitral courts in the greater 
Asian region include Kazakhstan’s Astana International Financial Center court. See Nicolás Zambrana-
Tévar, The Court of the Astana International Financial Center in the Wake of Its Predecessors, 12 ERASMUS L. 
REV. 122 (2019). The Chinese International Commercial Courts do not qualify as arbitral courts 
because they hybridize arbitration with litigation not by incorporating arbitration-like traits into court 
procedures, but rather by creating a tribunal that can urge parties toward alternative mediation or 
arbitration tracks before, or instead of, proceeding to litigation, similar to court-annexed arbitration 
experiments in the United States. See Cai & Godwin, supra note 93, at 895. 
133. Other examples of arbitral courts in the Middle East include the Qatar International Court 
and the Abu Dhabi Global Markets Court. See, e.g., Tiba, supra note 24, at 32. 
134. Other examples of arbitral courts in the Caribbean include the business courts in the Cayman 
Islands, Bermuda, and British Virgin Islands. See Moon, supra note 18, at 1438. 
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could be roughly categorized as a civil law jurisdiction, but the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC) is a separate common-law 
jurisdiction, and Dubai’s arbitral court is in fact the DIFC court.  
The focus here is on how each of  these courts has navigated the 
public/private divide between arbitration and litigation by carefully 
choosing procedural traits commonly associated with one or the other. They 
represent different variations on courts trying to have their cake and eat it 
too—to resemble both a court and an arbitral tribunal at the same time. 
Arbitral courts unsettle traditional understandings of  that public/private 
divide more than trends of  judicialization or privatization. They represent 
privatization gone so far as to possibly eclipse the public/private distinction 
altogether by handing the reins over to parties to define the courts’ 
procedures, scope of  authority, and very public nature. Perhaps ironically, 
the case studies below are informed by publicly available sources and 
therefore cannot reveal the extent of  proceedings in which these courts have 
granted parties’ requests for confidentiality.  
1. Delaware 
Delaware has long been an exporter of  corporate law. Its state judiciary’s 
expertise has helped propel Delaware’s dominance in corporate law. But 
arbitration offers meaningful competition to Delaware courts, particularly 
insofar as it offers valuable confidentiality of  disputes.135 The law was 
enacted “to enhance the Delaware courts’ prestige and extend its ability to 
adjudicate the nation’s most complex business disputes.”136 It was an 
“attempt . . . to marry one of  America’s premier business courts to the 
fundamentally more private consensual adjudicative alternative, binding 
arbitration.”137  
                                               
135. “Cloaking proceedings in privacy may also be a way of keeping the lid on other facts that 
might prove embarrassing—or worse.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or 
Closed Door Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349, 353 
(2013); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware’s Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario, in CAN DELAWARE BE 
DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 35 (Stephen M. 
Bainbridge et al. eds., 2017) (arguing that arbitration bylaws pose a threat to Delaware’s dominance in 
the corporate charter competition). 
136. Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Life and Death of Delaware’s Arbitration Experiment, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALB%K (Aug. 31, 2012, 11:58 AM), https://tinyurl.com/y2wbxba2. The legislative history states 
that the statute was “intended to preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering cost-effective options 
for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology matters,” 
which included bringing Delaware procedures into line with standard arbitration procedures, such as 
confidential adjudication “in a more streamlined fashion,” and relying on parties’ consent for 
jurisdiction. H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009), https://legis. 
delaware.gov/BillDetail/19375. 
137. Stipanowich, Arbitration Trifecta, supra note 135, at 349-50. The possibility of arbitration 
bylaws is also threatening Delaware’s judicial dominance. See LoPucki, supra note 135, at 35. 
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The Delaware House and Senate both approved the bill unanimously.138 
It appears to have faced no opposition in the legislature.139 Parties and 
potential parties to disputes before the Delaware arbitral court, presumably, 
agreed to use the procedure and were interested in the forum at least in part 
because it offered confidentiality. Indeed, one may wonder who would 
object to two private sophisticated parties choosing a particular method of  
resolving their disputes.  
Nevertheless, observers raised several objections relating to the interests 
of  persons not represented by the parties. Observers “complained that the 
confidential nature of  the process harms investors (by reducing the 
information available about the dispute), other businesses (by reducing the 
amount of  precedent on Delaware corporate law), and the public as a whole 
(by reducing the public accountability of  the court system).”140 As one 
commenter explained, “much of  Delaware’s value derives from the positive 
externalities that come from its corporate law jurisprudence,” but 
confidential disputes in the Delaware courts “might have the effect of  
degrading the continued development of  the Delaware common law.”141 
The Delaware Coalition for Open Government opposed the law for 
reducing access to government and public accountability of  the courts.142 
This group sued in the District of  Delaware, arguing that the Delaware 
statute permitted court proceedings “behind closed doors,” denying them 
and the general public their First Amendment right of  access to judicial 
proceedings and records.143  
                                               
138. Roll Calls, H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009), 
https://tinyurl.com/yxnxfv9m.  
139. This result fits with the “interest-group” theory of Delaware corporate law, which posits that 
the Delaware legislature serves the “(1) the ‘consumers’ of Delaware corporate law (principally out-of-
state shareholders and managers); and (2) the interests within the state that stand to benefit in various 
ways from the state’s chartering system.” Geoffrey Miller & Jonathan R. Macey, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1987). 
140. Christopher Drahozal, Judge-Arbitrators in Delaware, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2011), 
https://tinyurl.com/y6gspqjc (citing Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Troubled Deal and the Law of 
Unintended Consequences, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Nov. 7, 2011, 4:12 PM), 
https://tinyurl.com/yyjkhzbe); Brian Quinn, Delaware’s New Arbitration Rules, M&A LAW PROF BLOG 
(Jan. 27, 2010), https://tinyurl.com/yxmbrqnn; Brian Quinn, Skyworks Fireworks, M&A LAW PROF 
BLOG (Nov. 4, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/yxhnswhf. 
141. Quinn, Delaware’s New Arbitration Rules, supra note 140; see also Paul Kirgis, In Court, But Out 
of Sight: Chancery Court Arbitration, INDISPUTABLY (Dec. 15, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/y3ory8en (citing 
Quinn and raising other problems with the Delaware experiment, including the question of how 
Delaware judges will prioritize their time and efforts).  
142. The Coalition is a state affiliate of the National Freedom of Information Coalition (NFOIC), 
headquartered at the University of Missouri. The NFOIC describes itself as “a coalition of journalists, 
lawyers, elected officials, news organizations, business owners, government employees, civic 
associations and private citizens who believe that government of the people, by the people and for the 
people, should be open TO the people.” About, DEL. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV’T, 
http://delcog.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021). 
143. Complaint at 4, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2011) 
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The First Amendment prohibits governments from “abridging the 
freedom of  speech, or of  the press.”144 In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme 
Court held that “this protection of  speech includes a right of  public access 
to trials.”145 But that case was about a criminal trial. The Supreme Court has 
never addressed how the case applies to civil proceedings.146  
The Delaware case exemplifies this lack of  clarity. The district court held 
that the Delaware statute’s provision for confidential proceedings by 
Delaware judges in the Delaware courthouse was unconstitutional because 
the proceedings were analogous to civil trials, which, under Third Circuit 
precedent, require a public right of  access.147 On appeal, the Third Circuit 
judges considered that approach too simplistic. The judges instead followed 
the “experience and logic test,” which asks whether “‘there has been a 
tradition of  accessibility’ to that kind of  proceeding, and [whether] ‘access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of  the particular process 
in question.’”148 If  both experience and logic favor requiring public access 
to the proceeding, that establishes a presumption of  public access that only 
a compelling government interest can rebut.149  
The judges disagreed on how to apply that test here. As for experience, 
two judges held that civil trials had a history of  openness, while arbitration 
“reveal[ed] a mixed record of  openness.”150 For the logic test, the court 
identified many positive effects of  access and few benefits of  confidentiality 
for these kinds of  proceedings.151 For example, public access promotes 
informed discussion of  government proceedings, the perception of  
fairness, a venue for airing community concerns, and a check on corruption 
and fraud.152 Confidentiality, by contrast, was not so valuable, especially 
                                               
(No. 1:11–1015) (“Although the statute and rules call the procedure “arbitration,” it is really litigation 
under another name. Although procedure may vary slightly, the parties still examine witnesses before 
and present evidence to the Arbitrator (a sitting judge), who makes findings of fact, interprets the 
applicable law and applies the law to the facts, and then awards relief which may be enforced as any 
other court judgment. The only difference is that now these procedures and rulings occur behind closed 
doors instead of in open court.”). 
144. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
145. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)). 
146. See David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835 
(2017). Most lower federal courts recognize a right to public access to civil proceedings. Id. at 858 
n.142. 
147. The district court “concluded that because Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration 
was ‘sufficiently like a trial,’ and because a right of public access applies to civil trials, a right of public 
access must also apply to Delaware arbitrations.” Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 
510, 514-15 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
148. Id. at 514 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986)). 
149. Id. at 514.  
150. Id. at 518, 521. 
151. Id. at 518-19. 
152. Id. 
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when parties already had access to secrecy for trade secrets and other 
sensitive proprietary information. Judge Fuentes wrote separately to 
emphasize that the only constitutional problem with the statute was the lack 
of  public access to the proceedings.153 
Judge Roth’s dissent suggests that it is not entirely clear, as a matter of  
constitutional doctrine, what the law is and whether the Delaware court-
arbitration experiment is unconstitutional.154 Focusing on the history of  
arbitration, Judge Roth concluded that arbitration’s history is largely 
confidential. As a matter of  both history and logic, she reasoned, it makes 
sense for arbitration to be confidential—and therefore, arbitration, even if  
run by the state, is not subject to the First Amendment’s public access 
requirement.155 Regardless of  whether the majority or the dissent is right as 
a constitutional matter,156 the constitutional analysis demonstrates how 
arbitral courts challenge traditional public/private distinctions. 
The Third Circuit’s reasoning suggests that the boundary between 
public and private adjudication is defined by confidentiality. Delaware could 
have continued the process—with high fees, flexible procedures chosen by 
the parties, appellate review under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) standards, 
etc.—if  only the proceedings were made public. Delaware may have been 
able to go farther than that, even under the Third Circuit’s reasoning. It likely 
could have revised the statute so that the default rules for the arbitral court 
made the proceedings public, but parties could opt into confidentiality with 
the court’s permission. That might have created an exception that breaks the 
rule, but it would have put pressure on the scope of  a court’s authority to 
allow confidentiality in a particular case rather than as a question of  
institutional design, which might have escaped constitutional scrutiny.157  
After the Third Circuit decision, however, Delaware chose not to 
reenact the statute with everything except the confidentiality provision, and 
also did not attempt any clever work-arounds. Instead, it enacted the 
Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act (DRAA), which makes Delaware law more 
arbitration friendly, for example, with provisions that prevent Delaware 
courts from issuing anti-arbitration injunctions. This statute seems to have 
had limited success in terms of  the number of  contracts that designate 
arbitration under the DRAA.158 
                                               
153. Id. at 521 (Fuentes, J., concurring). 
154. Id. at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
155. Id. at 526. 
156. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 572 U.S. 
1029 (2014). 
157. See Bookman & Noll, supra note 30 (discussing expansive scope of judges’ equitable authority 
to dictate procedures in particular cases); cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
821, 823 (2018). 
158. Christopher Drahozal, Innovation in Arbitration Law, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 1, 
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2. The Netherlands  
Of  the European international commercial courts that have been 
established in the last few years, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC), 
which opened in January 2019, represents the greatest challenges to the 
public/private divide.  
The Netherlands Commercial Court has many court-like features. It has 
both a trial and appellate level. The judges are members of  the Dutch 
judiciary. Only Dutch lawyers, or European lawyers working with a Dutch 
lawyer, can represent clients there.159  
The NCC also adopts many traits of  arbitration. At the trial court level, 
a panel of  three judges and one law clerk hears disputes.160 Like arbitration, 
the NCC Rules allow considerable party autonomy over procedures.161 The 
Rules align with the International Bar Association (IBA) Rules on the Taking 
of  Evidence in International Arbitration,162 with some exceptions, and the 
parties may agree to depart from the standard rules of  evidence.163 
Confidentiality orders are permitted “for compelling reasons.”164 The NCC 
also charges higher fees than typical Dutch courts: € 15,000 to submit an 
international dispute to the NCC, and € 20,000 for an appeal, in contrast to 
€ 4,000 at the trial level and € 5,000 for an ordinary appeal.165 Proceedings 
and judgments are in English.166 
At the December 2018 legislative hearings to approve the bill that would 
establish the NCC, several members of  parliament expressed concerns 
about creating the chamber. Some argued that the NCC would create a two-
tiered judiciary—one for rich corporations, and one for the rest of  the 
country. They wanted assurances that “the capacity and costs of  [the NCC] 
                                               
2016), https://tinyurl.com/y5czfuc8; Christopher Drahozal, Innovation in Arbitration Law: The Case of 
Delaware, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 493, 499 (2016). A contract must be quite explicit in choosing to operate 
under state arbitration law rather than the FAA. See, e.g., Writing Arbitration Clauses to Get the Arbitration 
You Want, LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2016, 5:25 PM), https://tinyurl.com/yx8fjp8p. 
159. Key Aspects, STIBBE, https://tinyurl.com/yxs4scuu (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).  
160. NCC RULES art. 3.5.2. 
161. “[T]he procedural rules of the Netherlands Commercial Court provide flexibility, allowing 
proceedings to be conducted either in the civil law tradition, or in a manner more similar to proceedings 
in common law jurisdictions or international arbitration. This flexibility aims to make proceedings more 
recognisable for international parties.” Handbook on the Netherlands Commercial Court Published, STIBBE 
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yxgceapn; see also NCC RULES art. 3.4.1. 
162. Key Aspects, supra note 159.  
163. NCC RULES art. 8.3.  
164. Id. art. 8.4.2. 
165. Behandeling Engelstalige rechtspraak bij internationale handelskamers, EERSTE KAMER DER STATEN-
GENERAAL (Dec. 4, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y2z9dddx (statement of Mrs. Duthler (VVD)). 
166. Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 250-51. If a case were to proceed to the 
Dutch Supreme Court, however, proceedings there would be in Dutch. Annette Scholten, An 
International Netherlands Commercial Court?, TRANSNAT’L NOTES (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://tinyurl.com/y4p6k553. 
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will not be at the expense of  the capacity and resources for the other cases 
of  the judiciary.”167 Another Member of  Parliament (MP) worried that the 
NCC’s high fees would interfere with the right, guaranteed by Article 6 of  
the European Convention on Human Rights, that “entitles everyone to a 
fair and public hearing of  their case within a reasonable period of  time 
before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”168 Yet 
another MP expressed concerns about how the NCC’s innovations would 
be distributed throughout the rest of  the judiciary. Noting that judges are 
overworked and the judicial system is underfunded, the MP described the 
NCC as “a gold [band-aid], while for other wounds [band-aids] are not even 
available . . . .”169 To address this concern, the MP asked the Ministry to 
promise that excess fees from the NCC would “go back to the general 
resources of  the Council for the Judiciary, in order to cover the deficits 
there. Let the strongest shoulders carry the heaviest loads.”170 
The Minister of  Justice’s responses to these public-minded concerns 
shifted the focus to differences between courts and arbitration. He argued 
that while the NCC is more expensive than other Dutch courts, the real 
comparator should be arbitration—and the NCC is less expensive than 
arbitration.171 
Despite the MPs’ concerns, the legislation passed in December 2018.172 
On January 1, 2019, the Dutch launched the Netherlands Commercial 
Court.173 Some commenters seem confident that if  the court is deemed a 
success, that “will lead to a call to implement these adjustments in other 
cases as well.”174 Thus far, the NCC has rendered eight judgments in seven 
cases and has no pending hearings, according to the court website.175 
                                               
167. Behandeling Engelstalige rechtspraak bij internationale handelskamers, supra note 165 (statement of 
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Mrs. Andriessen (D66)).  
170. Id.  
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GENERAAL (Dec. 4, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y6gp25fv (statement of Minister Dekker) (“The NCC 
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2018), https://tinyurl.com/y2vq7jd2. 
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https://tinyurl.com/y52pfgen (last visited Feb. 13, 2021). 
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Commercial Court, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 15, 23 (2019).  
175. Netherlands Commercial Court, Judgments, DE RECHTSPRAAK, https://tinyurl.com/y2vdjkb4 
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3. Singapore 
Singapore, a small island country with limited natural resources, has built 
an “outward-looking economy” that seeks to import globalized business.176 
From the 1960s to the 1990s, it became “a leading manufacturing, 
transportation, shipping and financial services center in the global economy 
of  the early twenty-first century.”177 Since then, Singapore has continued 
those efforts and extended them into the realm of  international commercial 
dispute resolution, opening the Singapore International Arbitration Center 
in 1991, an international mediation center in 2014, and the SICC in 2015.178  
The establishment of  the SICC was remarkably quick and devoid of  
controversy. The Chief  Justice of  Singapore first suggested the idea in 
2013.179 A committee of  judges and “eminent international and local lawyers 
and legal experts” was then convened to study the idea, yielding a report180 
in November 2013 that was subject to a “public consultation” in December 
2013 and January 2014. The court’s framework was finalized by the end of  
2014, allowing the court to open on January 5, 2015.181 
The SICC’s stated purpose is “to enhance [Singapore’s] status as a 
leading forum for legal services and commercial dispute resolution” and to 
become “an Asian dispute resolution hub catering to international disputes 
with an Asian connection.”182  
The SICC identifies itself  as a court. Its website suggests that parties 
might prefer it to arbitration to avoid five potential problems:  
                                               
(last visited Feb. 13, 2021).   
176. Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception That Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: THE 
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 73, 77 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 
2008). 
177. Id. 
178. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 247; Erie, supra note 104, at 263. 
179. Establishment of the SICC, SING. INT’L COM. CT., https://tinyurl.com/y5g6uhl5 (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2021). 
180. ANG CHENG HOCK ET AL., SING. INT’L COM. CT. COMM., REPORT OF THE SINGAPORE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE (2013), https://tinyurl.com/y44bfauq 
[hereinafter SICC Committee Report]. 
181. Establishment of the SICC, supra note 179. 
182. SICC Committee Report, supra note 180, at 5; Michael Hwang, Commercial Courts and 
International Arbitration – Competitors or Partners?, 31 ARB. INT’L 193, 196 (2015). 
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1. over-formalization of, delay in, and rising costs of  arbitration; 
2. concerns about the legitimacy of  and ethical issues in 
arbitration; 
3. the lack of  consistency of  decisions and absence of  developed 
jurisprudence; 
4. the absence of  appeals; and 
5. the inability to join third parties to the arbitration.183 
Accordingly, the SICC touts itself  as providing speedy, relatively 
informal, low cost dispute resolution. Its judges follow an ethics code. The 
SICC follows the common law tradition and it aspires to develop 
transnational commercial law.184 The court also has broad power to join 
third parties and subpoena witnesses.185   
In its institutional design, however, the SICC borrows extensively from 
arbitration.186 Proceedings are in English (one of  Singapore’s official 
languages). The court has jurisdiction over international commercial 
disputes if  the parties consent to jurisdiction or if  the case is referred by 
Singapore courts; no connection to Singapore is required.187 The court 
offers flexible procedures and allows the parties to opt out of  default 
procedural rules. Parties need not seek court leave to serve parties 
extraterritorially if  the defendant is located abroad.188 Parties can waive the 
right to appeal. Subject to court approval, they can agree to keep the case 
confidential.189 Whether parties may designate non-state law to govern their 
                                               
183. Establishment of the SICC, supra note 179. 
184. Sundaresh Menon, The Transnational Protection of Private Rights: Issues, Challenges, and Possible 
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contracts is still untested,190 but the SICC Rules provide that foreign law 
may be proved as a fact.191 
Nearly half  the court’s judges are “international” judges, highly 
respected arbitrators or former judges from other countries including the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan.192 As in 
arbitration, parties may choose between filing an action before a single judge 
or a panel of  three judges.193 And whereas many courts require lawyers to 
be admitted to the local bar, the SICC welcomes foreign lawyers and has 
developed an ethics code for them.194  
The SICC is one of  the more successful arbitral courts thus far, in that 
it has cases and is beginning to develop case law. Since the SICC was created 
in 2015, it has rendered more than 70 judgments.195 Some have involved 
high stakes; the first decision resolved a S$1.1 billion dispute (about US $800 
million).196 The court has decided cases quickly, often within three months 
of  the hearing, and sometimes within 30 days.197 
In 2018, the SICC celebrated the first case submitted as a result of  a 
forum-selection clause. (Other cases to date had been referred to the SICC 
from the ordinary Singapore courts.) The court declared the case to be “a 
landmark achievement” and “a strong testament to the trust and confidence 
the wider legal community has in the Singapore judiciary.”198 
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at 938.  
 
2021] ARBITRAL COURTS 195 
The SICC has also announced at least one influential opinion, B2C2 Ltd. 
v. Quoine, a decision in a cryptocurrency dispute, written by Judge Simon 
Thorley.199 In an opinion by Chief  Judge Sundaresh Menon, the Singapore 
Court of  Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part in 2020.200 The SICC 
and Court of  Appeal opinions have been widely cited, including by lawyers 
in the United Kingdom advocating that UK courts should adopt their 
reasoning.201 U.S. scholars have also commended the decision, although with 
the caveat that it might not confront all the complexities of  “smart 
contracts” or transactional scripts.202 
The Singapore court’s blurring of  public and private adjudication does 
not seem to have been put to the ultimate test, however. Thus far, the SICC 
does not seem to have considered any cases in which the government or 
government-affiliated entities have been a party. Such a case would test the 
limits of  the SICC’s neutrality. Singapore courts have been known to favor 
the government in other contexts.203 If  the SICC takes a more independent 
stance in a government-related dispute, that will be the case it should 
celebrate. 
4. Dubai 
The Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) establishes a 
business-friendly legal jurisdiction that insulates foreign companies from 
local regulations influenced by Islamic law that might otherwise govern 
Dubai commerce. The UK lawyers who designed the DIFC court modeled 
it on a combination of  the London Commercial Court and international 
arbitration.204  
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The court has jurisdiction over international commercial disputes if  the 
parties consent to jurisdiction; in 2011, the DIFC removed any requirement 
that the case have a physical connection to the DIFC.205 But the court also 
has jurisdiction over other DIFC-related disputes. The DIFC honors parties’ 
choice of  law selections, including, possibly, if  they select non-state law.206 
Where parties have not designated the governing law, the background law is 
local “DIFC law,” “the result of  legislation and common law decisions.”207  
The court offers one set of  procedural rules modeled on the London 
Commercial Court’s and a second set of  alternative procedures modeled on 
common arbitration rules for increased flexibility. Like the Dutch arbitral 
court, the DIFC mimics the International Bar Association rules of  evidence 
for arbitration.208 Subject to court approval, parties can agree to keep the 
case confidential.209 Like the Singapore arbitral court, the DIFC court 
employs foreign judges, in this case some from the UAE but also from 
England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, and Malaysia.210 On February 8, 
2021, the Ruler of  Dubai appointed two new British judges to the Court of  
Appeal and the first female Emirati common law judge to the DIFC Court 
of  First Instance.211 This staffing represents a departure from ordinary 
Dubai courts. In another departure that mimics arbitration, foreign 
practitioners may practice in the DIFC courts if  they are in good standing 
in another jurisdiction.212 The DIFC courts have also developed their own 
professional conduct code for all lawyers authorized to appear before 
them.213 
In a unique attempt to combine court and arbitration features, the DIFC 
has an innovative approach to enforcement. It has recognized and enforced 
English judgments as though they were UAE judgments, and entered into 
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various agreements with other international commercial courts to encourage 
reciprocal recognitions and enforcement.214  
Even more interestingly, the DIFC Courts also allow parties to convert 
a DIFC court money judgment into an arbitral award at the DIFC-LCIA 
Arbitration Centre (or any other arbitration center).215 This unusual process 
would allow the winning party in a DIFC court proceeding to enforce the 
resulting money judgment as an arbitral award, which is easier to enforce 
internationally under the New York Convention.216 
The DIFC courts also allow joinder or consolidation of  “connected 
contracts,” parties, and proceedings.217 These rules articulate a loose 
standard for bringing in third parties who may be relevant to the case but 
not parties to the contract that formed the basis for the dispute, and for 
consolidating claims that might not arise out of  that contract. For the court 
to join a third party, it need not have independent territorial (or other) 
jurisdiction over that third party.218 Parties before the DIFC courts cannot, 
however, waive the right to appeal, and unusually, a non-party affected by 
the court’s judgment may also exercise the right to appeal.219 
Like the Singapore arbitral court, the DIFC court has developed a 
relatively robust docket. The court has heard disputes based on a DIFC 
forum selection clause.220 In 2016, the DIFC court decided 217 disputes 
involving, in the aggregate, more than $500 million.221 That same year, 42% 
of  contracts drafted in English in the Middle East and North Africa chose 
the DIFC as the seat for disputes.222 In 2019, DIFC Courts heard 952 cases 
involving, in the aggregate, over $840 million.223 Over 70% of  claims in the 
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Court of  First Instance arose from parties’ selection of  the DIFC Courts as 
their chosen forum.224  
The DIFC court has a high settlement rate, which some see as a sign 
that “the court is doing its job” and creating “certainty and trust.”225 In suits 
involving the government, however, the DIFC courts’ record is mixed. They 
have ruled against quasi-government corporations, but they have favored 
the government in all cases involving the DIFC Authority.226   
5. Cayman Islands  
In his study of  offshore tax havens, Will Moon has described the 
offshore business courts established in the past decade in Bermuda, the 
British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands as resembling arbitration.227 
The Cayman Islands Financial Services Division (FSD) court is 
representative, and an important example because of  historic controversies 
over the secrecy of  its dockets.  
The FSD is one of  the Cayman Islands’ four specialty courts. Its subject 
matter jurisdiction covers proceedings relating to mutual funds, contracts, 
Cayman Islands Companies Law, bankruptcy, and enforcement of  foreign 
judgments and arbitration awards, among other topics.228 For some of  these 
categories, the amount in controversy must exceed CI$1 million 
(approximately US$1.2 million in February 2021). While this subject-matter 
requirement seems to restrict cases to those involving Cayman Islands 
registered companies, it should be remembered that the Cayman Islands is 
a magnet incorporation jurisdiction for companies whose principals, 
employees, and places of  business are located elsewhere.229 As a result, FSD 
disputes—whether they involve contracts, bankruptcy, or other issues—are 
often transnational.230 
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The FSD is a domestic court that was designed to closely resemble the 
London Commercial Court. The Cayman Islands is a common law 
jurisdiction; the Privy Council in London is its highest court of  appeal.231 
Proceedings are in English. Foreign lawyers are not allowed to practice 
before the courts, except if  accompanied by a local lawyer.232 The Cayman 
Islands Code of  Conduct governs lawyers appearing before the court.233 
The court’s judges are business law experts, but not necessarily Cayman 
nationals.234 The former Chief  Justice of  Bermuda is an FSD judge,235 as is 
a Malaysian-born British national and a Turks and Caicos Belonger who was 
previously a judge in that country.236 
The FSD’s procedures are modeled after the London Commercial 
Court’s, and are responsive to users’ needs in the aggregate, even if  not more 
than usual in a particular court proceeding. Like many arbitral courts, an elite 
group of  lawyers designed the procedures.237 A User’s Committee continues 
to meet regularly to review “developments and the operation of  the FSD.”238 
As a result, the procedures tend to mimic English common law and also 
reflect the interest of  the firms’ corporate clients. For possible disputes 
where such clients might be on both sides of  the “v,” this system may yield 
fair and efficient proceedings. But in other contexts, the results may be more 
slanted.239  
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The FSD may be attractive to some litigants because of  the perceived 
potential for sealing cases. Confidential or proprietary information filed with 
offshore courts such as the FSD can be quite valuable, and therefore the 
content of  the FSD’s court files is often “the subject both of  pre-emptive 
applications for sealing and subsequent applications … for general 
access.”240  
To determine whether to seal records in such circumstances, the FSD 
adheres to open justice as “a fundamental principle of  the common law.”241 
The Cayman Islands Constitution requires that “[a]ll proceedings instituted 
in any court for the determination of  the existence of  extent of  any civil 
right or obligation, including announcements of  the decision of  the court, 
shall be public.”242 This requirement does not directly apply to certain ex 
parte matters, such as applications to authorize a settlement,243 but even in 
such proceedings, the common law principle—tempered with limitations 
based on “the interests of  justice”—remains.244 In cases where records or 
proceedings are sealed, the FSD has published opinions detailing the privacy 
and publicity interests it has weighed in deciding to seal the records.245 
There has been some controversy over allegedly excessive use of  sealing 
orders. According to a 2018 report by journalist David Marchant, after a 
history of  sealing fewer than 10% of  cases in the first seven years of  its 
existence, the rate of  sealing cases went from 15% in 2017 to 33% in the 
first half  of  2018, with 55% sealed in the 68 days between May 17 and July 
23, 2018.246 The spike seems to have followed a new Practice Direction that 
allowed sealing winding-up petitions, “a legal notice issued by a creditor like 
[a government tax authority] with the intention of  forcing a company into 
[fore]closure.”247 According to Marchant’s most recent analysis of  available 
                                               
240. Bernadette Carey, Open Book or Locked Vault? Access to Court Documents in the Cayman Islands, 
CONYERS, DILL & PEARMAN (Feb. 17, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6ezjgbw. 
241. In the Matter of the Companies Law (2013 Revision) and in the Matter of the SPhinX Group of Companies 
(in Official Liquidation) as Consolidated by Order of the Grand Court dated 6 June 2007), Cause No. FSD: 16 of 
2009 (ASJ) ¶ 7 (Jan. 30, 2017) (Cayman Is.) [hereinafter SPhinX]. 
242. Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009 sched. 2, § 7, https://tinyurl.com/ycaj5sax. 
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2020). 
 
2021] ARBITRAL COURTS 201 
statistics, in the first seven months of  2019, one third of  cases were 
sealed.248  
The Grand Court of  the Cayman Islands, however, disputed the 2018 
report. The Chief  Justice explained that the sealed orders generally were 
temporary and “made only for good reason.”249 Specifically, he argued that 
“most of  the cases not currently public are winding-up petitions, which are 
subject to a ‘special procedure’ that delays their publication,” usually for 72 
hours, “so a judge can assess the petition’s merit.”250 The court also 
defended the practice of  sealing winding-up petitions because publicizing 
such decisions, even if  they are dismissed as non-meritorious, can “cause 
irreparable harm” to a company’s reputation.251 Law firms also favored 
sealing winding-up petitions.252  
As for judicial opinions and decisions not under seal, the FSD appears 
to have made improvements to the accessibility of  opinions even since the 
time that the research for this Article began. For “full and unlimited access” 
to the Cayman Islands Law Reports, registered users must pay an annual fee 
of  CI$350/US$420.253 But visual access to reported and unreported 
opinions—including those cited in this Article—are now available by 
clicking through the Judgments portion of  the website, to Unreported 
Judgments, then Access Public Registers.254 
IV. TESTING THE BOUNDARIES 
Arbitral courts are the vanguard of  international commercial dispute 
resolution institutional design. By borrowing from “the best” of  both 
litigation and arbitration, Hiro Aragaki has explained, courts like the arbitral 
court in Singapore reject “an either/or choice between public and private 
adjudication; instead, they think of  dispute resolution holistically, all the 
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while borrowing one device from one process and glomming it on to 
another without so much as an afterthought.”255  
This Part provides the afterthought, and an accompanying critique. 
Arbitral courts and their designers may be throwing traditional distinctions 
to the wind. But can arbitral courts coherently reject the public/private 
distinctions in all senses? While there is a flexibility in the distinction 
between public and private adjudication in many respects,256 this Part 
contends that there are and should be limits because arbitral courts wield 
the power of  the state and relatedly because they have the potential to 
declare and develop law. 
This Part identifies three ways in which arbitral courts blur the 
public/private distinction, tracking the core fundamentals of  courts 
discussed in Part II: the hybrid sources of  arbitral courts’ authority and 
legitimacy, public access vs. confidentiality, and the role of  decisionmakers. 
It argues for maintaining some boundaries by keeping arbitral courts’ 
authority consistent with its basis for legitimacy, and by keeping arbitral 
courts transparent and open. Arbitral court judges will be key to any efforts 
to do this. 
First, there should be consistency between a court’s claim to legitimacy 
and its jurisdictional reach. If  a court claims legitimacy based on the consent 
of  the parties before it, then in theory its jurisdiction should be so limited, 
just as an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction would be. That consent should not 
justify the court reaching beyond what would otherwise be the limits of  its 
jurisdiction as it applies to parties and disputes beyond what the consenting 
parties’ agreement. Second, courts are public institutions—arms of  the state. 
When courts become confidential or entrust the parties with questions of  
confidentiality, they cross a line that is difficult to justify and will 
compromise courts’ ability to be effective in dispute resolution over the long 
term and in law making.257 Third, arbitral courts’ hybrid nature is also 
apparent in arbitral court judges, who may have experience as both judges 
and arbitrators and whose incentive structures combine aspects of  both 
arbitrators’ and judges’. If  arbitral courts are to make and develop law—one 
unique function that courts can offer258—then the judicial ethos should take 
                                               
255. Aragaki, supra note 16, at 564-65. 
256. See supra Part II. 
257. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 157 (discussing functions of courts in democracies beyond dispute 
resolution and law making); Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in 
Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 4 
(2008) (discussing courts’ additional functions in authoritarian states).  
258. Most arbitral courts are common law courts that make common law (even those, like the 
DIFC court, that are not located in common law countries or within a common law tradition). Courts 
in civil law countries, like the arbitral court in the Netherlands, also develop law, but in a different way. 
See Jan Komárek, Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 
 
2021] ARBITRAL COURTS 203 
precedence over any countervailing arbitrator ethos, to the extent that those 
conflict.  
A. Legitimacy, Jurisdiction, and Enforceability  
As discussed in Part II, a central distinction between courts and arbitral 
tribunals is the source of  their authority and legitimacy.259 For any given 
case, an arbitral tribunal’s authority comes from—and is limited by—the 
parties’ consent to jurisdiction through their arbitration clause. The arbitral 
tribunal’s decision is ultimately enforced by the state according to the scope 
of  this agreement. This limited authority supports arbitration’s legitimacy, 
which is buttressed by an international structure of  support built by 
international treaties, national courts, and private interests. Well respected 
decision-makers (arbitrators) also lend sociological legitimacy because of  
who they are, how they are chosen, and how they decide.  
Courts generally have different sources of  authority and sociological 
legitimacy—principally from the state. In democracies, courts may have 
democratic legitimacy and legal legitimacy.260 Their decisions can build 
internal legitimacy by being well reasoned and following existing law.261 In 
non-democratic states, courts may be able to build some of  this internal 
legitimacy but the state and its courts require a source of  legitimacy to take 
the place of  democratic legitimacy. One source of  any state’s legitimacy can 
be its courts—and indeed, arbitral courts, themselves—if  they conduct 
themselves in a way that appears legally sound, fair, and independent.  
That is, the legitimacy of  courts and their host states are bound up with 
each other. Courts, especially in non-democratic states, can lend legitimacy 
to the state as opposed to the other way around. Political scientists have 
documented that authoritarian regimes “need to portray themselves as 
respectful of  the rule of  law to prolong their grip on power” domestically 
to make up for their otherwise “questionable legitimacy.”262 From an 
international perspective, an independent judiciary is thought to project an 
image of  a reliable economic climate and foster investment and trade.263 
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Authoritarian governments seeking to cultivate independent judiciaries, 
however, can find themselves in a circular bind. The courts may potentially 
seek to limit the regime’s power; if  they do, then “[the] authoritarian regime 
must find ways to limit judicial power.”264 But the regime needs to limit 
judicial power “without formally eviscerating judicial autonomy, since such 
formal evisceration compromises the regime’s desire to project . . . legal 
legitimacy for its actions.”265 Sometimes that cycle leads to more rule of  law 
reforms, as authoritarian regimes seek to reestablish legal legitimacy in the 
face of  having compromised judicial power, in order “to restore investor 
confidence in the government’s commitment to the rule of  law.”266 But 
other studies suggest that “many regimes have figured out how to use law 
as an instrument of  social control over political critics without appearing to 
compromise formal judicial independence.”267  
Moreover, although courts may be in a position to limit a regime’s 
power, “the potential of  courts to live to fight another day as protectors of  
the rule of  law (perhaps when conditions grow less authoritarian) may 
ultimately depend upon their ability to refrain from challenging the regime, 
especially when the latter’s core interests are at stake.”268 In other words, 
courts and judges may pick their battles with the regime—and not check the 
regime’s power at every turn—because “going too far may ultimately result” 
in the regime restricting the judiciary’s power or “in a loss of  legitimacy for 
the judiciary, as judicial independence may come under direct fire that will 
produce a loss of  public confidence in the courts.”269 Thus “[e]ven rule-of-
law-minded judges must be wary of  this problem and may have to try to 
advance the rule of  law in a face-saving way, sending a message to the regime 
that its actions are unacceptable without seeming to threaten its core 
interests directly.”270 Doing so may require adept needle threading. 
Arbitral courts in non-democratic states seem poised to take on this 
paradoxical role. These jurisdictions are trying to encourage trust and 
investment by establishing reliable courts—but if  the courts challenge the 
state’s power, that might result in the state rejecting the courts’ power. 
Arbitral courts may face incentives to “pick their battles” to avoid 
“excessive” confrontations with the state.  
Arbitral courts present an unusual confluence of  these reinforcing 
power sources because they can claim legitimacy not just as arms of  the 
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state but also based on parallels to arbitration. That is, they have a two 
potential sets of  sources of  legitimacy and power: courts’ bases, including 
the state’s sovereign authority, and arbitration’s bases (the parties’ consent, 
the support of  an international network of  states, and the virtues of  the 
arbitrators). Like arbitration, arbitral courts seem legitimate because parties 
have chosen to have their disputes adjudicated there and because of  the 
status and reputation of  the decision-makers.271 For decades now, it has 
become commonplace that courts can adjudicate disputes based on forum 
selection clauses even if  the parties and the dispute have no ties to the 
forum.272 Parties can consent to jurisdiction in courts just like they can in 
arbitration, thereby giving the court or arbitral tribunal jurisdiction over a 
set of  parties and a set of  disputes that they would not otherwise have. The 
well-respected judges add an additional layer of  legitimacy.  
When parties consent to jurisdiction, it might seem logical that arbitral 
courts, like arbitration, would limit their jurisdiction to whatever the parties 
chose to submit to them. But this is not usually the assumption because 
arbitral courts also have the authority of  the state. Once parties have 
consented to a court’s jurisdiction, the court typically exercises the full force 
of  its powers—including the power to issue subpoenas and injunctive relief, 
to consolidate cases not subject to the parties’ forum agreement, to join 
non-consenting third parties,273 and to establish law that will be binding on 
future parties. Unlike what typically happens in arbitration, the parties’ 
consent does not limit the court’s jurisdiction to the parties who have 
consented. That is, consent-based court jurisdiction results in cases where 
courts can issue subpoenas to third parties, join third parties, and otherwise 
consolidate cases—even when there is no other territorial basis, beyond the 
presence of  the consenting parties, for the court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, part 
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of  the courts’ attractiveness as a forum is that they can bind third parties, 
adjudicate some kinds of  cases (like business torts) that might not be able 
to be subject to arbitration,274 and develop generally applicable law.275 
This result is at best awkward, and at worst illegitimate, especially in 
cases where the arbitral court joins a third party over whom it has no other 
basis for exercising jurisdiction. It is unclear how often this extension of  
jurisdiction would happen276 or whether it would be made public if  it did 
occur. 
The point, however, is that the questions of  jurisdiction over third 
parties test the boundary between the powers and legitimacy of  the court 
acting as a public or private dispute resolution forum. Arbitral courts 
suggest that the public/private boundary may be shifting in international 
commercial disputes (in courts or arbitration), to one defined by the line 
between authority based on parties’ consent and authority based on state 
sovereignty in courts with compulsory jurisdiction. Arbitral courts are trying 
both to straddle that line and to circumvent it.  
State sovereignty alone, however, does not establish judicial jurisdiction 
over everyone everywhere. Nor does it establish judicial legitimacy, especially 
when states seek to draw legitimacy from the strength of  their judicial 
institutions.277 This criticism applies to the arbitral court in Delaware, for 
example, which sought to base its legitimacy on the strength of  the Delaware 
judiciary, and relied on that basis as sufficient even if  the public nature of  
the court—and the accompanying public access and oversight and other 
democratic safeguards—were removed. In non-democratic states, the risks 
seem more severe. There, the pedigree of  the arbitral court judges and the 
arbitration-like (and common law) features of  the arbitral courts are 
intended to lend legitimacy and credibility to the state as well as the courts. 
But it is circular to have courts’ consent-based legitimacy support the state’s 
sovereign legitimacy, while also allowing the state’s power to extend the 
court’s power beyond its original source: the parties’ consent.  
Arbitral courts thus might do the converse of  what Daniel Markovits 
criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court and similar arbitration enthusiasts of  
doing: trying to have it “both ways.”278 Arbitral courts seek to be like 
arbitration and act as a contractual gap-filler when it comes to resting their 
authority on the parties’ consent (even without other sovereign or territorial 
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claims to jurisdiction), but to be like a court—with the full sovereign power 
of  the state—once some basis for jurisdiction has been established. 
Arbitral courts’ power, especially in common law jurisdictions, is not 
limited by considerations of  whether the court’s jurisdiction was granted 
solely by the parties’ consent (e.g., in a case with no other ties to the forum). 
This breadth of  jurisdiction is not shocking. Courts in New York and 
London have been exerting such power for decades. But the internal 
inconsistency should be flagged. Sociologically it may be harder to establish 
and maintain the legitimacy of  this practice in smaller, newer, and less liberal 
and democratic jurisdictions. This is not to say that the state’s power, e.g., to 
make law through common law courts, is inherently illegitimate if  the source 
of  the court’s jurisdiction over a particular case derives exclusively from the 
parties’ consent. Rather, there is a tension that has heretofore gone 
unnoticed and that may be strained if  the state is relying on the court to lend 
it legitimacy instead of  the other way around. 
The same limits echo in the area of  enforcement. One of  the most often 
cited reasons for choosing arbitration over litigation is the easy 
enforceability of  arbitral awards around the world. But this distinction could 
erode over time. Based on a trio of  treaties, the difference between easy 
enforceability (traditionally associated with arbitral awards) and stricter 
scrutiny (traditionally associated with enforcing court judgments) may 
ultimately depend on whether the parties have consented to the forum’s 
jurisdiction—not whether that forum was an arbitral tribunal or a court.279 
Under this framework, it could be consent, or its absence, that one day 
distinguishes between ready international legitimacy and suspicion—not the 
difference between an arbitral tribunal and a court. If  that becomes the 
norm over time, that may further weaken distinctions between arbitration 
and litigation in transnational disputes more generally. But as is the case with 
jurisdiction, if  enforceability is made easier because parties consented to the 
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tribunal’s jurisdiction, then the scope of  that consent should limit the scope 
of  that enforceability. That is, if  the SICC, for example, were to use its 
authority to join non-consenting third parties, over whom the court 
otherwise would not have jurisdiction, then foreign courts should be reticent 
to enforce that judgment against the third party.280 
Arbitral courts rely not only on consent as an arbitration-borrowed basis 
for legitimacy, but also on the personal legitimacy of  the decision-makers 
that signal the courts’ independence. Singapore, Dubai, and the Caymans 
thus have hired judges from the United Kingdom and elsewhere to bring 
with them the credentials, trustworthiness, and legitimacy that Delaware 
sought to sell with its judges.281 As non-nationals, these foreign decision-
makers may quell potential concerns that these courts will exhibit bias in 
favor of  local parties or the local government. One purpose of  hiring these 
judges is to fill in legitimacy gaps created by the fact that the court’s authority 
ultimately derives from the state in places where the state might otherwise 
face a legitimacy deficit.282 This personnel-driven legitimacy once again 
mirrors arbitration.  
Arbitral courts also try to fend off  some challenges to arbitration’s 
legitimacy in other ways. For example, arbitral courts adopt their own ethical 
rules, perhaps responding in part to perceived criticism that arbitration lacks 
an applicable ethics code.283 Likewise, some observers question the legitimacy 
of  arbitration’s practice of  letting parties choose arbitrators284 (although 
others suggest that this practice increases the likelihood the losing party will 
abide by the award285). Arbitral courts do not allow such a practice (although 
in theory they could). 
Whether this legitimacy, loaned by the chosen judges, will ultimately be 
credible will depend on how cases play out in these courts. Our ability to 
know how those cases play out will depend on arbitral courts’ commitment 
to openness. If  government or government-connected parties come before 
arbitral courts, will the courts maintain their neutrality? Put simply, will 
arbitral court judges be independent?  
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The proof  will be in the pudding. The ultimate test of  the substantive 
legitimacy may be in the outcomes of  cases.286 These courts are still new 
and must be watched for evidence. The DIFC courts, the oldest of  the 
examples, have had mixed results. As Matthew Erie has documented, DIFC 
Courts have ruled in favor of  the government bodies that have appeared 
before them, but they have also ruled against quasi-government 
corporations.287 This example yields both hope and skepticism—and a need 
for transparency to be able to monitor arbitral court independence. 
B. Publicity, Confidentiality, and Party Autonomy 
The previous section addressed challenges to arbitral courts’ hybrid 
approach to jurisdiction and legitimacy, and cautioned that the public’s 
ability to evaluate that legitimacy will depend on how much of  the arbitral 
courts’ operations the public can see. If  the working of  arbitral courts is 
kept completely confidential, that would of  course undermine the 
institutions’ legitimacy in its own right, as the Delaware experiment revealed. 
Most arbitral courts, however, purport to be public institutions. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, however, arbitral courts give parties considerable choice and 
control over procedural and evidentiary rules, with seemingly little court 
oversight to ensure, for example, the fairness of  the procedures. For many 
such rules, one may not worry about this lack of  oversight, assuming that 
the parties’ need to agree will offer self-regulation. That is, the parties’ 
interests will be antagonistic towards each other and will balance each other 
as they negotiate for procedures, obviating the need for judges to supervise 
for fairness. For example, the plaintiff  might want extensive discovery, the 
defendant might want minimal discovery, and in contracting for procedure, 
they might reach a compromise solution.  
On confidentiality decisions, however, experience teaches that the 
parties’ interests will likely be aligned in favor of  confidentiality even though 
public access—to courts’ proceedings, records, and decisions—would be in 
the long-term institutional interest of  the forum and of  the law. Permitting 
party control over decisions about confidentiality, therefore, may cross the 
public/private divide.  
In arbitration, parties are free to agree to keep their disputes—including 
the proceedings and resulting decisions—confidential and private. 
Confidentiality is not an inherent attribute of  international commercial 
arbitration, but it is an available option, and appropriately so.288 Moreover, 
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when confidentiality is on offer, parties often choose to keep their disputes 
secret. Parties’ control over confidentiality is not particularly worrisome 
insofar as the effect of  the arbitration remains private and binding only on 
the consenting parties, without legal impact for others. Indeed, the call for 
more transparency in international commercial arbitration comes with its 
increasingly influential role in global governance. Without that impact 
beyond the parties, confidentiality between truly consenting parties may not 
be concerning.  
Courts, however, ordinarily limit opportunities for confidentiality of  
regular proceedings and of  judicial decisions, and courts and scholars alike 
urge the importance of  “open justice.”289 Even when the disputes involve 
private parties arguing over private law issues, courts working “out of  sight” 
(like confidential arbitration) compromise both their legitimacy and their 
ability to develop law in the public interest.290 Courts’ openness “sustains 
judicial independence, legitimates public investments in the judiciary, and 
offers routes to oversight when courts fail to live up to obligations to treat 
disputants fairly.”291 Privatizing disputes risks “erod[ing] public confidence” 
in courts; prevents “checks against both unfairness to some litigants . . . 
behind closed doors and potentially corrupt practices by attorneys, judicial 
officers, and litigants”; and “threatens to impede public awareness of  the 
substantive law.”292 The purpose of  open justice, the UK Supreme Court 
recently stated, “is not simply to deter impropriety or sloppiness by the judge 
hearing the case. It is wider. It is to enable the public to understand and 
scrutinise the justice system of  which the courts are the administrators.”293 
Open justice is necessary “to enable the public to understand how the justice 
system works and why decisions are taken.”294  
The pitfalls of  trusting the openness of  arbitral courts to the parties 
have been demonstrated in the court context, for example, in the history of  
the opioid litigation,295 as well as in international commercial arbitration, 
where calls for more institutional transparency have run up against party 
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preferences.296 Party control over confidentiality choices is a little like 
defendant control over forum choices—the allocation of  decision making 
authority typically decides the outcome.297 
The traditional distinction is that in arbitration, parties have 
considerable control over procedures including questions of  confidentiality, 
whereas in courts, especially common law courts, the public has access to 
the proceedings and decisions of  the courts. This public/private division 
has been eroding for some time, as detailed in Part II. Even before arbitral 
courts, increased party autonomy over procedures had governed choice of  
forum, choice of  law, and procedural decisions over issues such as discovery. 
But parties had not been given control over the public nature of  court 
proceedings should they occur.  
Arbitral courts potentially upend that distinction. They are poised to 
cross the line from judge control over confidentiality, with at least strong 
presumptions against it, to party control over confidentiality decisions and 
minimal judicial supervision, with presumptions favoring the parties’ 
preferences. Judges may still be the ultimate decision-makers, but they have 
strong incentives to favor pleasing the parties. And party preferences are 
likely to favor confidentiality.  
Arbitral courts have put themselves in this position to cater to their 
customers—i.e., potential parties to international disputes. Offering 
confidentiality is a form of  “forum selling,”298 a way to compete with 
arbitration to attract parties to select the arbitral court in their forum 
selection clause or otherwise choose the arbitral court for disputes.  
The originators of  the term “forum selling” suggested that the practice 
was problematic when courts were selling themselves to plaintiffs with 
unilateral control over forum choices, but not if  parties were agreeing on a 
forum in a forum selection clause.299 In that latter situation, the authors 
assumed parties would choose the best courts for both parties (perhaps each 
party’s second choice), and courts would be driven to provide quality 
proceedings that would satisfy both sides.  
But there are times when the parties’ interests conflict with those of  the 
court and the public. Josh Karton has demonstrated that transparency 
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presents such a conflict in international commercial arbitration.300 The 
institution needs transparency to sustain sociological and legal legitimacy. In 
arbitral courts, these needs exist to an arguably even greater extent. Arbitral 
courts are new, and therefore need to publicize what they are doing to 
establish these different kinds of  legitimacy. In democracies, open justice is 
necessary to bolster judicial independence, legitimacy, and to allow for 
public oversight with respect to cases and lawmaking more generally.301 
Arbitral courts in non-democratic states have an even higher burden to 
demonstrate to the public—and the world of  commercial parties who might 
choose to litigate their disputes there—that they are independent and follow 
the law.302 
C. The Decision Makers  
A third dividing line between arbitration and litigation in courts is the 
decision maker.  
Studies of  international commercial arbitrators303 depict them as private 
citizens with a business service ethos; in deciding cases, they often focus on 
commercial reasonableness, and are typically less concerned with creating a 
legal rule that will have staying power for the next case than they are with 
resolving the case for the parties who have hired them.304  
Judges, like arbitrators, come in many stripes and their approaches to 
decision making are far from monolithic.305 But again, generally, national 
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commercial court judges tend to be public servants rather than private 
citizens, and conceive of  themselves as such. Common law judges 
traditionally aim to resolve cases with an eye towards creating a rule that will 
be applicable and manageable in future cases rather than exclusively yielding 
a result that satisfies the parties. Some judges have been accused of  “forum 
selling,” particularly in situations when plaintiffs have “a wide choice of  
forum,” which creates incentives for the judges “to make the law more pro-
plaintiff  because plaintiffs choose the court with the most pro-plaintiff  law 
and procedures.”306 
Like arbitral courts themselves, arbitral court judges can be something 
of  a hybrid between arbitrators and national court judges. Some arbitral 
court judges are or were judges in other existing courts in the domestic 
system; indeed, the Delaware arbitral court judges were simply Chancery 
Court judges given additional responsibilities. The “international” judges at 
the Singapore, Dubai, and Cayman Islands arbitral courts are well respected 
former judges from the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions, although 
some come from private practice or have experience as an international 
arbitrator. At the Singapore and Dubai courts, there are a few civil law judges 
in addition to a roster of  well-regarded common-law judges. Many of  these 
international judges also sometimes serve as arbitrators.307  
Like international commercial arbitrators, these judges are desirable 
decision makers because they have expertise in relevant law, in decision-
making, and in international commercial disputes.308 They are well respected 
not just for their expertise but for their ethics and virtue.309 Because they are 
not locals, they may offer more neutrality than typical judges, who might be 
thought to be biased in favor of  local parties.310 These individuals may 
indeed be the key to arbitral courts’ success—and to their legitimacy. 
But regardless of  their nationality, like ordinary court judges, arbitral 
court judges are structurally positioned within the architecture of  the state. 
They are paid by the state. They have been recruited by the state to jumpstart 
these new institutions and may feel (virtuously) invested in the institutions’ 
success.  
As a result, arbitral court judges have hybrid incentive structures that 
are difficult to parse. Whereas judges, whether on domestic or international 
courts, are often said to have a “systemic perspective” when adjudicating 
cases, that perspective is often said to have “less importance in international 
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arbitration, which, [for the arbitrator], is essentially a service to the 
parties.”311  
How will this hybrid posture affect arbitral court judges’ behavior and 
affect the relationship between the state and the arbitral court? How will 
arbitral court judges perceive their role and the role of  their new institution? 
How will they perceive their loyalties—to the development of  their home 
law (e.g., English law) or forum law (e.g., Singapore law), to the resolution 
of  particular disputes, or to the furtherance of  their institutions? And will 
states that otherwise lack separation of  powers and full judicial 
independence construct and respect those ideals with respect to arbitral 
courts?  
Because neither arbitrators nor judges are monolithic groups, further 
research interviewing these judges and investigating the answers to these 
questions is important. For now, this Article’s modest task is to raise these 
questions. The hybrid nature of  the institution of  the arbitral court makes 
it unclear whether arbitral court judges will conceive of  themselves more as 
judges or arbitrators. Their attitudes will affect how they interpret law, 
resolve cases, and decide procedural questions like whether to grant the 
parties’ request for confidentiality. For arbitral courts in jurisdictions with 
uncertain histories of  judicial independence, it remains to be seen how the 
state will interact with the judges and vice versa. 
Finally, arbitral courts to date, unlike arbitration, do not allow parties to 
choose their decision makers. Some may think this limit removes the 
attraction of  arbitration, as well as a key to its legitimacy—parties may be 
more likely to accept a decision if  they have a say in choosing who decides. 
But others who question the legitimacy of  a decision made by an adjudicator 
chosen by the parties may argue that this omission makes arbitral courts all 
the more authoritative. 
In short, the hybridity of  arbitral courts is epitomized in the hybridity 
of  arbitral court judges. It is still unclear what this unusual combination of  
ingredients will yield. The future of  arbitral courts, discussed in the next 
Part, may rest largely on the shoulders of  arbitral court judges and how they 
choose to respond to—and resist—the institutional incentives handed to 
them. 
V. THE FUTURE OF ARBITRAL COURTS 
Thus far, this Article has documented the emergence of  arbitral courts 
around the world as a culmination of  long trends in the convergence of  
public and private adjudication. The previous Part argued that arbitral 
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courts’ efforts to blur the boundaries between these two types of  
adjudication should reveal the limits of  convergence. Courts, as public 
institutions, should have consistent articulations of  legitimacy and 
jurisdiction and should provide transparency and public access. If  arbitral 
courts establish and maintain legitimacy and transparency, they have 
significant potential for international influence—not just in resolving 
individual disputes, but in global governance and in their capacity to declare 
and develop transnational law.  
This Article yields, in some sense, a simple answer to the question of  
what arbitral courts should do: They should take seriously their public role 
as courts. They should embrace, promote, and protect judicial independence 
and accountability, which includes and indeed depends upon transparency. 
And in cases where they derive their legitimacy and jurisdiction from foreign 
parties’ consent, they should limit the exercise of  their power to the scope 
of  the parties’ contract. If  they exercise power beyond that scope, it should 
at least be confined by other limits on judicial jurisdiction. Arbitral court 
judges are the key players who are poised to decide whether arbitral courts 
will do this. 
These judges seem to have strong incentives to provide parties—
including potentially the state—with requested confidentiality. States create 
arbitral courts to cater to the needs of  certain kinds of  parties; they design 
them to be a more attractive forum than arbitration. To have cases, and 
simply to exist, arbitral courts need parties to want to resolve their disputes 
with them. Granting confidentiality requests—allowed by the courts’ 
rules—may seem like a minor accommodation that serves all these 
purposes. Likewise, arbitral courts, as new institutions, may be positioned to 
try to establish and build their own power, and asserting jurisdiction over 
non-parties, or issuing broad injunctions, may seem like a natural way to 
assert judicial authority.  
Currently, there are three sets of  internally inconsistent incentive 
structures that might make arbitral courts police confidentiality requests and 
jurisdictional expansion more strictly. The first is the “market.” Making the 
court attractive to potential parties may include offering confidentiality. But 
it also requires the court to be transparent enough to advertise what it is 
doing and to showcase its restraint, quality, and independence. Second, the 
judges themselves may bring with them both a liberal and restrictive judicial 
ethos. Third, the state may want arbitral courts to be at least somewhat 
transparent and restrained to build the state’s and the courts’ legal legitimacy. 
Each of  these potential restraints is a two-sided coin with incentives that 
lean both towards and away from transparency and restraint. 
First, the so-called market. Arbitral courts are still quite new. In the 
beginning, the need to establish a reputation to support the court’s legal and 
sociological legitimacy may make arbitral court judges more reluctant to 
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push the boundaries of  their power and to grant parties’ confidentiality 
requests. The standard explanation of  arbitral courts and commercial courts 
more generally is that they—like arbitration—are driven by parties’ (the 
market’s) needs and desires. The pressure to cater to the potential 
customer—the potential parties to transnational disputes—is real, both to 
accumulate cases and to justify the court’s continued existence. Over time, 
as the court establishes its reputation, it will gain more freedom to 
accommodate parties’ demands for confidentiality and expansive use of  
jurisdiction. Within certain bounds, the arbitral court may be able to rest on 
its reputation, especially if  it is exercising its power in secret. 
Second, the arbitral court judges, especially the international judges, may 
bring with them a restrictive judicial ethos. Hiring respected judges has 
signaled and provided arbitral courts’ expertise in both commercial law and 
managing cases as well as a liberal sense of  judicial independence. It remains 
to be seen whether arbitral court judges will also or alternatively be driven 
by an arbitrator ethos that focuses on the parties’ dispute and commercial 
reasonableness over common law development or the interests of  third 
parties. A judicial ethos might restrict judges’ grant of  parties’ request for 
confidentiality and include a sense of  judicial restraint, prioritizing instead 
the institutional and public law interests of  the court, whereas an arbitrator 
ethos might view confidentiality as an uncontroversial choice that is up to 
the parties. As noted in Part II, even in traditional courts, judges have 
increasingly recognized their role as more managerial and oriented towards 
serving private parties’ dispute resolution needs. Arbitral courts could 
provide a forum in which this kind of  privatization is prized and cultivated. 
Third, the state’s influence may reinforce parties’ preferences for 
confidentiality—since the state is also trying to accommodate parties’ 
preferences to encourage parties to invest and to adjudicate disputes in the 
state. Delaware provides the best example of  a state trying to cater to the 
market’s desire for confidential state-subsidized decision-making.312 
Likewise, if  the state appears as a party—or is otherwise involved in or 
connected to a case—then it could use its influence to affect the proceedings 
or the outcome of  the case, or to keep the proceedings confidential. But as 
discussed in Part IV, the state is also interested in the institutional integrity 
and legitimacy of  arbitral courts and as such it may promote arbitral courts’ 
jurisdictional restraint and preservation of  transparency.  
Existing structural incentives, therefore, may be strong at times for 
arbitral courts to grant confidentiality requests and exercise broad 
jurisdiction; at other times or in other situations, however, arbitral courts’ 
incentives may push in the opposite direction. Arbitral courts should resist 
the urge to cater to the market in particular cases in favor of  their longer-
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term interest in showing themselves to be independent, sophisticated, and 
legitimate courts.  
The problem is that, from the institutional self-interest perspective, 
arbitral courts need only enough transparency to establish and maintain 
legitimacy and, possibly, to declare and develop substantive law. Complete 
transparency may not be necessary to satisfy the “market,” and indeed, many 
potential parties (and, at times, the state) may desire confidentiality. Over 
time, as the institutions gain legitimacy and positive reputations for 
independence, those reputations will give them cover for allowing more 
confidentiality upon request, to the detriment of  broader and longer-term 
institutional interests. Neither the market nor the state necessarily promotes 
their best interests by advocating more transparency—like arbitral tribunals, 
they have interests in providing as much confidentiality as users desire. 
Arbitral court judges will ultimately be deciding what constitutes enough 
transparency for judicial independence and institution building, but they 
may also have incentives to satisfy the parties and the state sufficiently to 
ensure the continued existence of  the arbitral court as an institution.  
Arbitral courts should therefore tie themselves to the mast of  publicity 
today so that they do not fall to the temptations of  confidentiality requests 
tomorrow.313 Today, while they may still recognize the supremacy of  their 
institutional interests in transparency over the parties’ interests in 
confidentiality, arbitral courts and their host states should bind themselves 
to a commitment to publicity. Opinions discussing the importance of  the 
open justice principle, like those from the Caymans court, could be examples 
of  such commitments.314  
Another way to do this might be to specify in bilateral or multilateral 
recognition and enforcement agreements with other countries that court 
decisions would be enforceable, or more easily enforceable, if  those 
decisions are routinely made public. Currently, the most common 
requirements found in these agreements are that the court originally issuing 
the judgment have jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties and that the 
judgment not violate the sovereignty and public policy interests of  the 
jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.315 In other words, the 
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international regime over recognition and enforcement of  judgments and 
awards could favor enforcement of  public awards from consistently public 
courts and disfavor enforcement of  confidential awards and/or awards 
from insufficiently public courts, at least outside of  arbitration.316 Another 
option might be simply to publicly declare a commitment to openness for 
the sake of  independence and legitimacy. One problem, however, is that it 
could be difficult to police this commitment if  the parties involved and the 
court are all in favor of  confidentiality. How would one know that the 
arbitral court was operating confidentially? The decision lies mainly in the 
hands of  arbitral court judges deciding individual confidentiality motions. 
If  they commit to openness, arbitral courts may ultimately be well 
positioned to develop transnational law and have significant influence, 
especially in areas of  the law that are new or dominated by arbitration and 
therefore lacking in many published precedents. The SICC’s decision in 
Quoine is a prime example of  this potential. It is consistent with the SICC’s 
commitment to developing transnational commercial law, filling holes in the 
common law often attributed to the proliferation of  arbitration in certain 
areas of  contract law.317 As the Chief  Justice of  Singapore has said, “if  major 
and complex commercial cases are heard by arbitral tribunals rather than 
courts, judicial precedents might become outdated, and this might be an 
impediment to the development of  a lex mercatoria.”318 In this atmosphere, 
arbitral courts should be “well placed to develop jurisprudence.”319  
This potential, however, requires arbitral courts to have both the 
legitimacy and transparency of  public adjudication. Doing so is not without 
costs. Where parties prefer confidentiality, they may opt for arbitration over 
arbitral courts if  confidentiality is available in one but not the other. But not 
all disputes require confidentiality.320 Dubai and Singapore, for example, are 
establishing not just litigation destinations in the form of  arbitral courts321 
but multi-door legal hubs that cater to litigation, arbitration, and other kinds 
of  ADR simultaneously and in the same location. They therefore may be 
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better able to attract more disputes overall—and exert more influence—by 
establishing arbitral courts with stronger claims to legitimacy and 
independence, as demonstrated by and through the courts’ openness and 
legitimate exercises of  more limited jurisdiction. The law that the arbitral 
courts develop may then apply in these other more private fora (like 
arbitration or mediation)—but its impact will be harder to observe. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has identified the emerging phenomenon of  arbitral courts 
and placed it in the context of  trends of  the judicialization of  international 
commercial arbitration and the privatization of  court procedure. It has 
argued that arbitral courts are testing the traditional boundaries between 
public and private adjudication in ways that potentially put more pressure 
on questions of  consent-based jurisdiction than on public/private 
distinctions. It has also highlighted the importance of  legitimacy and 
transparency for the full functioning of  courts. It has warned of  the dangers 
of  leaving confidentiality decisions up to parties who would likely favor 
confidentiality even at the expense of  institutional interests in open justice. 
In the end, it argues that if  arbitral courts can commit to legitimacy and 
transparency, they may be able to have real global influence, including in 
shaping substantive law. 
Arbitral courts raise a host of  additional questions that are ripe for 
further scholarly inquiry. For example, arbitral courts create several conflicts 
of  law puzzles. How should other courts treat forum-selection clauses 
choosing arbitral courts as the parties’ chosen forum—like an arbitration 
clause or like a forum-selection clause? If  arbitral courts enforce parties’ 
choice-of-law clauses designating non-state law, will that lead other courts 
to do so? Will other courts enforce arbitral court decisions—and on what 
basis? What res judicata effect will arbitral court judgments have 
internationally? What preclusive effect does a confidential arbitral court 
decision have? 
Arbitral courts also raise broader questions about judicial reform and 
access to justice. Will the creation of  these courts produce positive effects 
for the rest of  the judiciary in the host states322 or simply focus resources 
on “one percent procedure”?323 In Dubai, for example, will the creation of  
a common law jurisdiction with common law courts including foreign 
judges influence the rest of  the local judiciary and result in liberalizing the 
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rest of  the state and increasing the rule of  law? The foreign judges at the 
Astana International Financial Centre court do not have many cases yet but 
have been tasked with touring the nation and educating Kazakh judges 
about the common law.324 What will be the effect of  these education tours? 
Can the identity of  the judges or other arbitration-like features change the 
very nature of  a state’s court system? Will the SICC exhibit more judicial 
independence than other branches of  the judiciary? Matthew Erie has begun 
to investigate these questions;325 future work should continue these efforts.  
One possibility is that arbitral courts might herald the advance of  
increased rule of  law in illiberal host states, but not necessarily have any 
liberalizing effect, for example, spreading democratic governance.326 
Arbitral courts have the potential to be strong legal institutions that uphold 
the predictability of  the law and promote economic stability and growth. 
Especially in non-democratic or not completely democratic states, arbitral 
courts’ outward facing motives seem to be to inspire investor confidence or 
attract international commercial disputes, but may not have broader effects 
of  transforming the judiciary or the state.327 It is unclear how well those 
financial motives will discipline the state or the courts. Arbitral courts may 
be well-suited, indeed, to play the role of  courts in authoritarian states—
lending legitimacy to the regime, enforcing state power, and encouraging 
investment.328 Particularly if  they eschew transparency, they may serve these 
roles without yielding other trickle-down liberalizing effects. 
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